Who unmasked Mr. P. Chidambaram?

Power, domination and violence. The armed conflict between Maoists and Indian state

Table of Contents

List of abbreviations

List of figures

1 Introduction
1.1 Critical overview of the state of research
1.2 Problem and question
1.3 Approach
1.4 Structure of the work
1.5 Central terms

2 Power, domination, legitimacy and conflict
2.1 Power
2.1.1 Power according to Weber
2.1.2 Forms of Power
2.2 Domination
2.2.1 The nature of domination
2.2.2 The process of institutionalization from power to rule
2.2.3 Power-building processes
2.3 Legitimacy
2.3.1 Legitimate rule
2.3.2 The emergence of legitimacy: basic legitimacy
2.4 Conflict and collapse of power

3 State Rule - Ideal and Reality
3.1 The ideal of the modern state
3.2 State rule in the third world
3.3 The state as a field of power - state rule in the periphery

4 armed groups
4.1 Armed groups as social actors
4.2 The violent resolution of the conflict
4.2.1 The guerrilla strategy
4.2.2 The ambivalent character of violence
4.3 Formation and internal institutionalization
4.4 External institutionalization: territorial domination and legitimacy

5 The Indian state
5.1 The historical emergence of the Indian state - lines of continuity and breaks
5.1.1 Political rule in pre-colonial India
5.1.2 British colonial rule
5.1.3 Independent India: Continuities
5.1.4 The Indian developing state: omnipotence and limited scope
5.2 Political rule in the periphery
5.2.1 The local administration
5.2.2 The agricultural sector
5.2.3 The marginalization of the indigenous adivasis

6 The institutionalization of the Naxalite movement
6.1 Formation and development of the Naxalitic movement
6.2 The CPI (Maoist)
6.2.1 The self-description of the CPI (Maoist)
6.2.2 The institutionalization of the CPI (Maoist)

7 Institutionalization of territorial rule
7.1 Attack on the existing order
7.2 Use of power by the Naxalites
7.3 Institutionalization of Power - Establishment of Rule
7.3.1 Standardization and positionalization
7.3.2 The positional structure of domination - territorial domination
7.4 Establishing legitimacy

8 The response of the state
8.1 Adjustment of the violent apparatus
8.2 The state security forces on duty
8.3 Undifferentiated violence
8.4 Alternative approaches

9 Conclusion
9.1 The conditions for the success of the Maoists
9.2 Outlook


List of abbreviations

Figure not included in this excerpt

List of figures

Figure 1: Spread of the Maoists (South-Asian Terrorism Portal 2009)

Figure 2: Organization chart of the CPI (Maoist) (Ramana 2008: 198)

1 Introduction

"I have consistently held that in many ways, left-wing extremism poses perhaps the gravest internal security threat our country faces." - Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, September 15, 2009 (quoted from BBC 2009).

"No quarter can be given to those who have taken upon themselves to challenge the authority of the Indian state and the fabric of our democratic polity." - Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, April 21, 2010 (quoted from Indian Express

“The battle is to restore hearts and minds. [...] For any reason, villagers think the Naxals are their friends and adversary is the govt, we cannot win this battle. ”

- Indian Minister of the Interior P. Chidambar on September 13, 2011 (quoted from Today.IN 2011).

These quotes all refer to the Maoist rebels, the so-called Naxalites, who challenge the Indian state with armed force and exert considerable influence over some regions of its claimed territory. From the quotes it can be seen that the state classifies the Naxalites as a serious threat and that this must be countered. However, this seems to be problematic as the Maoists receive support from large parts of Indian society and at the same time reject the Indian state.

Since Maoist rebels in neighboring Nepal overthrew the ruling monarchy in 2005 after years of guerrilla warfare (cf. Hutt ed. 2004), the threat posed by the Naxalites in India has been perceived more strongly (cf. Ramana 2008: 117). According to estimates by the Indian Ministry of the Interior, the Naxalites were active in 20 of a total of 28 federal states in 2010. Within these states, 223 districts are affected, compared to only 55 in 2003 (Sahni / Singh 2010). A considerable expansion of the Maoists can therefore be stated. Last year, 1003 people died in violent clashes between the Naxalites and state government troops, the highest figure since 1971 (Magioncalda 2010; MHA 2011: 21). The conflict between the Indian state and the Naxalite movement has existed for more than 40 years. In some cases, the state was able to suppress the movement for a short time by means of massive violence. However, it was never possible for him to end the conflict in the long term (cf. Dixit 2010). On the other hand, the Naxalite movement was fragmented and weak for a long time. At the beginning of the 1980s there were more than 30 different groups, some of which were at war with one another (cf. Singh 2010: 124). However, in 2004 the two largest groups that People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI), for Communist Party of India (Maoist) [CPI (Maoist)] merged. Since then, around 95% of the movement has been organized under the umbrella of the newly founded group (cf. Marwah 2009: 146). From then on, the massive expansion of the Maoists began, who subsequently merged their bases and proceeded in a much more coordinated manner.

Figure not included in this excerpt

Figure 1: Spread of the Maoists (South-Asian Terrorism Portal 2009)

In autumn 2009 the Indian state launched a large-scale offensive, the so-called Operation Green Hunt started against the positions of the Maoists. However, the state can show little progress, instead the conflict escalates (cf. Sahni 2010). The Maoists have repeatedly been able to carry out particularly spectacular attacks on the security forces, in which numerous police officers have been killed. Each of these attacks shook the Indian public strongly and cast doubt on the state's ability to decide the conflict for itself (cf. Spacek 2010).

From the perspective of the Maoists, their development so far can be described as relatively successful. They managed to survive for almost half a century despite constant repression by the state. Furthermore, they have been able to steadily expand their area of ​​influence in recent years without the state being able to effectively counteract this expansion.

Analysts have repeatedly warned that the armed conflict could seriously jeopardize India's development as an emerging economic nation that intends to play a more important role at the international level (cf. Chakravarti 2010).

1.1 Critical overview of the state of research

Since the conflict has existed for over four decades, a large amount of scientific work has been published on the subject since then. However, since 2004, the year in which the two largest Naxalite organizations merged, the conflict has received increased attention from the scientific community. So are in Economic and Political Weekly, probably the most important regular publication for political scientists in India, 80 articles have appeared on this topic since then (cf. EPW 2011). Despite the extreme severity of the conflict, it has so far attracted little international attention. That is why it is largely treated by Indian or Indian-born authors.

Due to the long duration, the wide spatial spread of the conflict as well as the complex nature of armed conflicts (cf. Jung / Schlichte / Siegelberg 2003: 16), an abundance of studies with different focuses has been published since then. Those authors who consider the conflict from a historical perspective make it clear that a process of professionalization has been taking place within the Naxalite movement since the 1980s (cf. Singh 2010; Marwah 2009). With the formal union to the CPI (Maoist) a high point had been reached in this respect, whereby the threat to the Indian state increased considerably (cf. Banerjee 2006; Kumar 2008).

Other authors have devoted themselves in particular to the strategies and activities of the Maoists (cf. Chakrabarty / Kujur 2010; Ramana ed. 2008). For the power of the rebels, they particularly blame their focus on the population, from whom they often receive support. In many places the Maoists exert considerable influence on local society, in some cases they have even set up their own governments. Much of the literature revolves around the issues of the causes of conflict and which approaches the state should pursue. In this context, most authors refer to socio-economic grievances such as unjust legislation (cf. Agrawal 2010), poverty and underdevelopment (cf. Mehra 2009; Mohanty 2006) as well as discrimination against broad strata of Indian society (cf. Guha 2009; Subramanian 2007 ). As a result, the underprivileged in society, because of their hopeless situation, took up arms to offer resistance. According to this, the conflict is embedded in a larger context of internal social disparities that the Indian state must first address before it can think about resolving the conflict. In this context, the violent actions of the state, which would only escalate the conflict even further, are repeatedly criticized (cf. Subramanian 2010; Singh 2011). For several years now, extensive reports (cf. Navlakha 2010; Roy 2010; Chakravarti 2007) as well as anthropological studies (cf. Shah 2010; Shah / Pettigrew ed. 2009) from the conflict regions have enriched the state of research. This work, which generally focuses on the common people and the lower rebel cadres, provides important insights into the concrete actions of the Naxalites in the local area.

Despite the rich scientific treatment of this topic, the conflict is generally not dealt with using available theories from war research. In most cases, these are general representations with little theory and collections of facts on specific individual topics. Although it is recognized that this is an internal conflict, the conditions of Indian statehood are seldom included in the analysis (cf., however, Subramanian 2007; Sahni 2010 a).

In this context, there have recently been some fruitful contributions from a political-sociological perspective within qualitative war research (cf. Bakonyi / Hensell / Siegelberg eds. 2006; Jung / Schlichte / Siegelberg 2003; Daase 1999; Holsti 1996). Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg point out that war is a social phenomenon that for this reason must also be explained in terms of social theory (2003: 17). In addition, a change in the form of the war is noted, according to which the majority of all wars waged worldwide are of a domestic character and are fought in Africa, Asia and Latin America (cf. Schlichte 2007: 296). In this context, it is called for in particular to take into account the conditions of state rule and the social conditions in the conflict regions (Jung / Schlichte / Siegelberg 2003: 17f.). Hensell and Siegelberg refer to the hybrid character of most states outside the OECD, ie the connection between modern and traditional forms of rule (2006: 19). This characteristic is an expression of the fact that state rule has remained controversial in the Third World. The resulting conflicts often escalate into internal wars (Hensell / Siegelberg 2006: 30). In this context, Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg developed the following thesis: " The subsequent consolidation of the presupposed statehood is the most general condition for armed conflicts in the states of the Third World "(2003: 60). This points to the importance of looking at state rule and alternative power arrangements in domestic wars in order to gain an understanding of the conflicting conditions.

1.2 Problem and question

As mentioned at the beginning, the Maoists have been able to steadily expand their presence to other regions over the past few years. Today their sphere of influence extends from the Nepalese border to deep in the south (see Fig. 1) and is becoming revered among the Indian public Red Corridor called (see Sahni 2007). For the population living there, the Maoist rebels are powerful actors, some of whom even rule the local area. Some areas, to which the state has no access, are owned by the Naxalites Liberated Zones called. There they have established state-like structures of rule, including taxes, their own laws, courts and people's governments (cf. Dash 2006: 56f.) Although the Indian state is making considerable efforts to enforce its sovereignty over the affected areas, it has so far hardly achieved any success. The armed forces of the state security forces, which were mobilized against the Naxalite strongholds in 2009 in a major offensive, exceeded that of the rebels by at least three times, but could hardly gain any ground. The Naxalites, on the other hand, managed to survive for almost half a century despite ongoing repression by the state and developed into a powerful actor in many regions of India. From this perspective, the Maoist rebels seem to be quite successful in relation to their state opponents.

The focus of this work should therefore be on the following question: How can the relative success of the Maoist rebels be explained? The success of the Maoists relates to their efforts to expand their power on Indian state territory, in part to the point of territorial rule. In order to gain a full understanding of this relative success of the Maoists, various closely related factors must be considered.

Since the activities of the Maoists undermine the sovereignty of the state, the Indian statehood comes into focus. The conditions of state rule in India form the structural context in which the Maoists operate. They must be taken into account if one wants to learn about the circumstances of the expansion of the Naxalites and their attainment of territorial control. In addition, the investigation of the Maoists' success must of course also focus on the rebels. Since the Naxalites are a collective actor, the first thing that is of interest is the institutional structure of their organization. In addition, the strategies and methods they use to expand their position of power in the affected areas should be considered.

The action of the state is basically aimed at preventing the expansion of the Maoists. However, since the latter has not yet been able to cope with this challenge, the strategy, actions and effects of the state reaction must be included in the investigation.

The aim of the present analysis is to show that several factors are decisive for the success of the Maoists. In the context of Indian statehood, the Naxalites find a number of favorable conditions that they take advantage of in a targeted manner. In addition, the movement was able to learn from its initial mistakes and build a strong organization. It was possible for this to implement a number of strategies in order to suppress the influence of the state and to establish its own forms of rule in its place. In contrast, the state has not yet been able to develop a uniform strategy to successfully win the challenge.

1.3 Approach

With reference to the innovative contributions of sociology to war research, a socio-theoretical perspective on the armed conflict between Maoist rebels and the Indian state will follow. Since the focus of the study is placed on the expansion of Maoist power and rule in the context of Indian statehood, a sociological perspective is suggested. For this purpose, reference is made to Max Weber, the founder of the sociology of domination (cf. Aden 2010: 11). The categories of power, domination and legitimacy systematized by him are to be placed in relation to the conflict for analysis in order to gain a new, theoretically well-founded perspective. However, Weber's concept is quite static in some places and cannot fully capture dynamic processes such as armed conflict. For this purpose, the basics of the sociology of rule are expanded by the considerations of Heinrich Popitz, who presented the emergence of rule as an institutionalization process.

Since the Maoist rebels and the Indian state are at the center of the investigation, states and armed groups should also be related to the sociological categories from a general perspective.The insights gained from this are used to classify the conflict to be investigated.

The subject areas of the sociology of rule in general as well as state rule and the institutionalization of armed groups in particular form the theoretical basis of the present work. The theoretical foundations are related to the described factors of Maoist expansion, namely Indian statehood, Maoist organization, their strategic approach and the state's reaction. The conflict is viewed as a negotiation process for power, rule and legitimacy through violence.

For this purpose, a qualitative text and document analysis based on primary and secondary sources is carried out in order to deal with the research question. The secondary sources are academic adaptations of the conflict in the form of monographs, contributions in anthologies and journal articles. Publicly accessible documents from the CPI (Maoist), the Indian Ministry of the Interior, human rights reports from non-governmental organizations and autograph reports are also included as primary sources in the investigation.

The material is examined and interpreted from a sociological point of view in order to identify reasons for the success of the Maoists. The overview of the state of research has shown that a large number of different subject areas are relevant to the examination of the discussion. The approach described offers the possibility of considering several factors within the complex subject area of ​​war. An attempt should be made to establish connections between the individual research priorities. The inclusion of various factors in the analysis enables a complex approach that avoids one-sided explanations.

1.4 Structure of the work

The present work consists of two main parts: A general theoretical basis (Chapters 2-4) is followed by the analysis of the armed conflict from a domination-sociological perspective (Chapters 5-8).

The theoretical basics consist of three chapters. First, the sociological categories of power, especially violence, domination and legitimacy, are presented. In the following two chapters, these are connected with the conditions of statehood, with a focus on post-colonial states and the institutionalization of armed groups.

Chapters 5 to 8 take a separate look at the respective factors that are related to the theoretical fundamentals from the previous chapters. State rule in India is considered in the fifth chapter. Since rule is a process, its development is first presented from a historical perspective. In addition, the structuring of statehood in the local area, where the Maoists extend their power, is given special attention. The next chapter deals with the organization of the Maoists. At this point the development of the Naxalite movement is traced from a historical perspective. Then the program and strategy as well as the institutional design of the CPI (Maoist) operating today will be examined. In the seventh chapter the actual actions of the rebels are in the foreground. It shows how the Maoists try to displace state structures and establish their own forms of territorial rule. The government's response to the Naxalite challenge is discussed in the final chapter. The strategies used and the effects of government action are considered.

1.5 Central terms

The terms Naxalites and Maoists are used synonymously in the following. The term Naxaliten comes from the name of the village Naxalbari, in which a violent peasant uprising occurred in 1967. This event is cited in literature as the starting point of a movement which subsequently, referring to Marxism-Leninism and Maoisism, pursued the goal of a violent revolution (cf. Gupta 2004: 79f.). During its development, a large number of different groups emerged which, although divided over organization and strategy, all intended to overthrow the Indian state. Since then, Maoist ideology has been the central characteristic of the movement, which also called itself Maoist (cf. Chakrabarty / Kujur 2010: 1).

However, a few groups that play an insignificant role in today's conflict have turned away from armed struggle (cf. Kujur 2008: 6). Strictly speaking, the term Naxalites does not only refer to those groups that are involved in the violence. The following study focuses mainly on the CPI (Maoist), newly founded in 2004, which unites around 95% of the movement under its roof. So when Maoists or Naxalites are mentioned in the following, either the CPI (Maoist) or one of their violent predecessors is meant.

The concept of rebels is not entirely undisputed. In the following work, he shall designate an organized group that intends to violently overthrow the ruling order (cf. Schmidt 2010: 664; 1995: 801).

There is disagreement in war research about the exact delimitation between war and armed conflict. I refer to the definitions of the Working Group on Research into the Causes of War (AKUF). For a war, three conditions must be met:

“A) two or more armed forces are involved in the fighting, at least one of which is regular armed forces (military, paramilitary units, police units) of the government; b) There must be a minimum of centrally controlled organization of warfare and combat on both sides, even if this does not mean anything more than organized armed defense or scheduled raids (guerrilla operations, partisan warfare, etc.); c) the armed operations occur with a certain continuity and not just as occasional, spontaneous clashes, that is, both sides operate according to a planned strategy, regardless of whether the fighting takes place on the territory of one or more societies and how long they take place last "(Schreiber 2010: 7).

In contrast, it is an armed conflict if these three criteria are not fully met. The AKUF has classified the struggle between Maoists and the Indian state as a war since 1997 (Wojczewsk 2010). However, since in the following the conflict is not only dealt with from 1997 onwards, but also its historical development is considered, the term "armed conflict" is used in the working title.

All other terms that are relevant to the content of the work, in particular power, violence, rule, legitimacy as well as the state and armed groups, are dealt with in detail in the subsequent theoretical chapters.

2 Power, domination, legitimacy and conflict

Since the conflict between Maoist rebels and the Indian state is to be examined below along the lines of power, rule and legitimacy, these central terms are briefly presented at this point.

2.1 power

2.1.1 Power according to Weber

Max Weber defines power as "Every chance within a social relationship to enforce one's own will against resistance, regardless of what this chance is based on" (Weber 2010: 38). This rather brief provision implies various facts. First of all, it is an asymmetrical social relationship in which one side has a chance of power, while the other side has to submit to those in power. The concept of chance also indicates that power is only about the availability of possibilities for action, not their actual use (cf. Palonen 1998: 175).

Furthermore, Weber describes power as amorphous (Weber 2010: 38), that is, informal or indefinite, since it can come to light in countless forms, it can in principle come to anyone under certain conditions and in different situations. Therefore the concept of power does not imply a connection to a person or a permanence. However, this characteristic also prompted Weber to give the concept of power no further sociological meaning, since it is not possible to define it more precisely (cf. Tyrell 1980: 60f.). For this reason, he concentrated on the stabilized, permanent form of power: rule (see Section 2.2.1).

2.1.2 Forms of Power

Following Weber's concept of power, however, Heinrich Popitz attempted to make it more precise. According to Weber, power refers to an unequal social relationship between inferior and superior. The difference is based on the connection between the chances of using power on the one hand and the dependence on this application on the other (cf. Maurer 2004: 20). Popitz was able to derive four different forms of power from this constellation: action power, instrumental power, authoritative power and data-setting power.

Action power

The power to act lies in the connection between people's vulnerability in principle and their ability to be injured: "Power to act is power to hurt" (Popitz 2007: 43). Everything a person possesses can ultimately be taken from him through the exercise of power, in the final sense even his life. The person exercising power is in a position to do something to the loser due to the power of disposal over the means of power. The injury can be of a physical, social or material nature (Popitz 2007: 43f.). However, Popitz mainly refers to physical violence, the use of which is based on the openness to physical injury. His concept of violence is narrowly defined and refers exclusively to deliberate harm to the human body. The injured person is subjected not only physically but also socially. Action power is often of a sporadic nature and does not pursue long-term goals (Popitz 2007: 46-48).

Since the ultimate injury can be inflicted on people by means of violence, namely to cause their death, the idea of ​​“perfect power” is associated with this form (Popitz 2007: 53). However, this turns out to be a double-edged sword, because the person wielding power is in principle open to injury and can be killed (Popitz 2007: 57). “Power can be perfect because it can do the utmost. Power is imperfect because the ultimate decision cannot be monopolized " (Popitz 2007: 60). Under the term total violence, Popitz summarizes three action elements that justify the increase in violence (Popitz 2007: 66-74).

1.) The glorification of violence denotes its glorification and causes its legitimation. It is based either on highlighting their superiority or as an instrument for liberation from domination.

2.) Indifference relates to the victim's suffering and eliminates any inhibitions on the part of those who use violence. The cause for this are generally social separation walls, which enable the perpetrator of violence not to be able to identify with the victim.

3.) Technological progress enables the infinite increase of the means of power, the range of their application is increased as well as the possible number of the oppressed.

Instrumental power

Instrumental power is the basis of every long-term power relationship and aims at the deliberate control of human activity (Popitz 2007: 79). This is done through the use of threats and rewards1 human orientation towards the future.

uses. The threat relates to the use of action power. The future actions of the threatened are burdened with possible consequences (Popitz 2007: 81). The threatened person is offered two options: He can behave in accordance with the request or not. If the request is violated, the oppressor threatens to use sanctions himself, there is a coercive situation (Popitz 2007: 81-85).2 Any lasting power relationship ultimately rests on instrumental power, as it can standardize the actions of the underdog (Popitz 2007: 87). In this context, Popitz emphasizes the special importance of instrumental power as "Lever for control" (2007: 90). In the case of compliant behavior, the threat turns out to be a favorable means of power, since no means of sanction have to be used (Popitz 2007: 91). At the same time, the threatening person can register an increase in his power base, as he profits from the desired behavior himself (Popitz 2007: 27). This is a reason for the expansion of power.

Authoritative power

Authoritative power refers to the instrumentalization of a bond with authority. The authority bond describes a social relationship in which one side recognizes the superiority of the other and voluntarily submits to it. Authority is assigned to the other (Popitz 2007: 121). It is based on the human need to be recognized and socially accepted by others. This striving for recognition is particularly aimed at those to whom one feels inferior (Popitz 2007: 115).

Where instrumental power is primarily based on the fear of the application of action power, authoritarian power goes beyond that, in that the loser submits voluntarily. What is special about this form of power is that it is possible to rely on conforming behavior outside the control area of ​​the person in power (Popitz 2007: 108). In addition, the loser even takes over the positions and criteria of the ruler, "Authoritative relationships get under your skin" (Popitz 2007: 108). For this reason, the one in authority generally does not need to use coercion. However, the attachment to authority can also be used by threatening to refuse recognition or enticing with the prospect of recognition (Popitz 2007: 109/129). This describes the authoritative power, which is also able to control the behavior of people in a targeted manner.3

2 This indicates that threats are stretchable beyond their real possibilities. Threats can be bluffed. In this way, the actual power can be increased and the threatened person finds himself in a situation of uncertainty (Popitz 2007: 83-85).

Data-setting power

Data-setting power refers to the ability of people to purposefully change the material environment through the use of tools. These changes have an impact on people as they have an impact on their living conditions (Popitz 2007: 167). This form of power in turn influences the social environment through the material (Popitz 2007: 31). Technical progress makes it possible to increase power potentials (Popitz 2007: 178).

2.2 domination

2.2.1 The nature of domination

Rule is called by Weber "Opportunity to find obedience for a command with a certain content from deliverable persons" defined (Weber 2010: 38). Domination describes a stabilized, permanent power relationship that is structured through superiority and subordination. Within this constellation, the side exercising power controls the actions of the underdogs with success. By means of discipline, the command of the rulers meets the incontrovertible obedience of the ruled; they feel obliged to obey the instructions of the authority (Weber 2010: 38 / 693-695).4 The expectability of the relationship of domination gives it its specific character and thus represents a special case of power (Weber 2010: 691).5

Dominant relationships regulate and structure the social world by formulating binding instructions for action. The existence of a system of rule depends on the extent to which the ruled actually orient their actions on the basis of these guidelines. To ensure this, the system of rule rests on two pillars that support its existence from within and from without (cf. Müller 2007 a: 123). The external guarantee concerns the ruling organization, with the ruling side securing the ruling order through the use of coercive measures.

Rule violations are sanctioned so that a general threat situation exists. The inner guarantee of order is established by Weber's concept of legitimacy (see Section 2.3). In this case, those involved believe in the normative validity of the order, accept and follow their instructions out of inner conviction. In this context, Popitz emphasizes that lasting, legitimate relationships of power are based on both authoritarian and instrumental power (2007: 79/135).

With regard to the organization of rule, Weber makes it clear that every rule over a large number of people requires an administrative staff that enforces and implements the rule of law (2010: 157). The administration, which is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of rule, comes between the two poles of ruler and ruled (Weber 2010: 697). The ruler and his staff have material administrative resources at their disposal to maintain and implement order. Not the typical, but the specific means of administration concerns the use of physical force as a last resort (Weber 2010: 39). The staff is usually a small number of people tied to the ruler.Weber points out that only motives such as simple habit and purposeful considerations would make the relationship precarious. Here, too, it is crucial that the staff have a belief in the legitimacy of the order (Weber 2010: 157).

Social reality is structured by regularities of social action. These regularities are constituted by actual practice (custom), habit (custom) and interest (Weber 2010: 20f.). Weber uses the term social order to designate instructions for action that are safeguarded by sanctions. The unorganized enforcement of sanctions is called the convention, the organized law. The latter is the product of domination. Its highest degree of organization gives it the highest degree of stability (Weber 2010: 25f.). An order is also legitimate if the instructions appear to be binding to those involved. This gives it stability (cf. Fitzi 2004: 98). The actual orientation of those involved in the order is responsible for its reproduction. The objective validity is therefore dependent on the subjective perception of the participants with regard to their binding nature.

Rule causes social groups to stick together and is the cause of their purposeful action. Weber calls social groups an association. They are characterized by the fact that membership in this social relationship is closed or restricted in a regulating manner. Its existence is guaranteed by the leader, usually together with a enforcement staff. Furthermore, there is an association code that applies to its members and that is used to guide the actions of the head and the staff in order to enforce them (Weber 2010: 34f.).

An association that claims the validity of its order for all people within a certain geographical area and tries to enforce it successfully by means of coercion is a regional association. In this way, order is imposed on non-members of the association (Weber 2010: 662f.).

Regional associations strive to monopolize the exercise of power in their claimed area. In this context, the monopoly of force is of central importance.6 This is the development product of a process in which competing potentials for violence are gradually expropriated by the association and the association successfully claims the only legitimate exercise of violence for itself. With the monopoly of violence, the association gains stability (Weber 2010: 662). In addition, there is a monopoly on legislation and jurisdiction. The end product of this development is the ideal type of the occidental institutional state (see Section 3.1).

2.2.2 The process of institutionalization from power to rule

Where Weber devoted himself to the investigation of the nature of rule, Popitz was particularly interested in its development. Popitz understands rule as an institutionalized form of power. In a step-by-step model, he attempted to trace the process of the gradual institutionalization of sporadic power to rule. Popitz identifies three general tendencies in this process:

1.) Through the emergence of power structures, positions and offices, the power relationship remains in place despite the loss of the current ruler. This development is called depersonalization.

2.) In connection with the structuring, a formalization of the power relationship can be established. There are regularities in the use of power, combined with norms and rules.

3.) The power relations advance into the social environment and gradually connect with it, so that they stabilize each other. The balance of power is integrating "In an overarching order" (Popitz 2007: 233).

Taken together, these three tendencies lead to a gradual consolidation and stabilization of the balance of power. With increasing institutionalization there is also an increase in power. For one, power can be extended over more people as well as over a larger geographic area. But also the validity and the related conformity can be increased. On the other hand, the intensity of the impact can also be increased if the person exercising power is able to change social orders or to enforce his power against resistance (Popitz 2007: 235).

With each stage of the institutionalization process, the power relationship solidifies. The first stage is the sporadic exercise of power. It takes place in one of the forms of power described above, but does not repeat itself. In order to achieve normative power as the next level, four conditions must be met:

1.) Sufficient means of power must be available to repeat the exercise.
2.) There must be repeatable situations to which this power can be applied.
3.) This means that repeatable performance must be successfully achieved (Popitz 2007: 237).
4.) Last but not least, the loser must be tied to the ruler in some way so that he cannot evade this exercise of power. This bondage can take the form of a relationship of authority, as can also be due to the fact that the underdog is prevented from fleeing by means of power (Popitz 2007: 238).

Normative power standardizes behavior, conforming behavior becomes normal. " A here-and-now docility has become an always-if-then docility " (Popitz 2007: 239). Violence, like instrumental power, is gradually receding into the background. This relief releases forces so that power can expand and intensify further. Normative power becomes more expectable for all those affected (Popitz 2007: 242f.).

The depersonalization, which is already becoming apparent through the routine exercise of power, is completed at the next stage, positionalization. The position of the ruler develops into an office. The power relationship is given shape and structure and from this level onwards is referred to as domination (Popitz 2007: 244f./255). Popitz develops three archetypes of positions of power which, taken by themselves, represent answers to elementary challenges facing society (2007: 254).7 The judge's task is to resolve conflicts of norms. In his authority he identifies violations of the social order and decides on the execution of sanctions (Popitz 2007: 250). The position of the military leader arises in the event of a danger from outside in order to ensure the defensive capability of the group. Because of the concentration of power in his hands, especially in the form of violence and armed supporters, this type tends to consolidate his power (Popitz 2007: 254).

In the fourth stage, the “emergence of positional structures of rule”, an apparatus of rule emerges, that is, positions and offices around the ruler who are involved in rule over the long term. With the regulation of the relations between the members of the staff, the ruling apparatus tends towards specialization and division of labor, which releases new forces (Popitz 2007: 255). The associated followers are mostly recruited from pre-structured social relationships or during social crises in which the need for attachment increases (Popitz 2007: 256). The formation of the ruling apparatus, however, requires a continuous supply relationship between ruler and apparatus in order to bind them in the long term. In order to guarantee the continuous receipt of goods and resources, services are demanded and redistributed from the ruled (Popitz 2007: 257). Because of this, power at this level tends to expand over more people and establish rule over a fixed geographic area. (Popitz 2007: 258).8

At the fifth and final stage of the institutionalization process, Popitz sees the emergence of state rule. This is connected with the elimination of possible competitors and the associated monopoly of power in the areas of violence, law-making and jurisdiction (Popitz 2007: 258).

2.2.3 Power-building processes

In connection with the process of institutionalizing power relations, the relevant questions are how it is possible for a minority to rule over a majority and which factors favor the formation and expansion of power. In doing so, Popitz comes to the conclusion that people or groups are given opportunities that they can use to expand their own power. If they are not used, the power-building process gets stuck (Popitz 2007: 186). In doing so, he works out various possibilities that can be decisive for the power-building process.9

1.) superior organizational skills:

Within a group, a minority with a common interest can organize itself faster and more effectively than the majority. This happens especially when the minority has a common interest in cooperation (Popitz 2007: 191/196). This is likely if the minority are the beneficiaries of an order, for example those who own, and this order is to be defended externally. This does not mean that the order has to meet the consent of the majority, but this majority finds it difficult to formulate a common interest. Their chance and ability to organize themselves are rated lower (Popitz 2007: 194).

2.) Superiority through solidarity:

Crisis social conditions increase the willingness to bond and have the potential to “weld” people together. The solidarity within the group creates an attitude of the "Help [s] and share [s]" (Popitz 2007: 204), which can achieve increases in efficiency in a wide variety of ways through close cooperation. This frees up further resources (Popitz 2007: 209).

3.) Graduation of the losers:

In order to guarantee the exercise of power by a minority, the organization of a further group from the circle of the underdogs that can challenge this power relationship must be prevented. To this end, the group in power can downgrade and fragment the inferior by sharing part of the exercise of power. In this way the organization of a powerful opposition is prevented (Popitz 2007: 210f.).

4.) Reproduction of power through redistribution:

By using means of power (violence / threats), the group in power can force the oppressed to cede material goods to the center of power, which in turn can be redistributed, for example to the staff. Through this redistribution process, those in power are regularly given material means of power that lead to the reproduction of the power relationship (Popitz 2007: 219). Once the system is in place, coercion takes a back seat.

2.3 Legitimacy

2.3.1 Legitimate rule

The so-called understanding of legitimacy is decisive for the existence and duration of the power relationship (Weber 2010: 659). It describes the mutual reference between rulers who claim the validity of the order of rule and the ruled who believe in the lawfulness of the order. In this case, the superior's claim to legitimacy meets the inferior's belief in legitimacy. For the existence of rule, Weber generally presupposes the existence of an agreement of legitimacy (Weber 2010: 157). Depending on the sources of legitimacy from which the belief in the legitimacy of a domination relationship is fed, the domination relationship is structured according to different points of view. To make this clear, Weber formulated three ideal types10 legitimate rule.

The legal-rational rule

Rational or legal rule is based on statutes. This means that rule is followed on the basis of belief in a formal, abstract norm, such as laws (Weber 2010: 159). The order is impersonal and also the persons in a ruling association who exercise the actual rule, the leader and the administrative staff, are bound to it. The members of the ruling circle are determined by the application of the objective order. Their relationship is structured through an objective, strict hierarchy of offices and a division of labor. The administration is based on the factual order. It applies equally to all persons within the domination relationship. New law can be introduced by means of an agreement or an enforcement, this only depends on the provisions of the order (Weber 2010: 160f.). The ideal type of administrative staff in rational rule is bureaucratic officialdom. The legal-rational rule is a characteristic of all modern associations and the occidental state (Weber 2010: 164).

The traditional rule

The traditional order of rule is based on established habit and the belief in the legitimacy of the order that has always been there. The ruler is determined by means of traditional rules (Weber 2010: 167).

The ruler is also tied to tradition, which is why the creation of law in the pure type is in principle impossible. Nonetheless, the ruler has a certain arbitrary scope. However, if he himself violates the traditional order, he must expect resistance (Weber 2010: 167). This resistance against the ruler is then based on him as a person, not against the entire system of rule. The administrative staff generally consists of servants who are bound by personal loyalty to the master. The administrative staff lacks the formal criteria of bureaucracy. His actions are largely shaped by the arbitrary authority of the ruler (Weber 2010: 169).

The charismatic rule

The belief in legitimacy in charismatic rule is based on the ruler's charisma. The charisma describes the extraordinary ability of a person, Weber speaks in this context of the “God-sent” or “exemplary appearance” of the charismatic bearer, which other people see in this person. This quality makes the owner a leader; his administrative staff is selected according to charismatic aspects, inspiration and personal ties (Weber 2010: 179f.). It is new and breaks with what was there in a revolutionary way. The rule is characterized by the individual will of the leader and therefore a lack of rules. It has only a low degree of predictability (Weber 2010: 181). The charismatic rule has an extraordinary legitimation problem, since it depends on the continuance of the charism of the leader. If it passes, the rule passes too. The bearer of charisma is obliged to prove his charisma regularly, which is what his extraordinary ability is based on. Since the rule is completely focused on the leader, it usually breaks with the disappearance of the owner (Weber 2010: 179). However, it is possible to make the charism everyday, that is, to transform it in the direction of traditional or rational rule. This can be due to the material and ideal interest of the ruled, but especially of the administrative staff, in the continuation of this order (Weber 2010: 182-188).

2.3.2 The emergence of legitimacy: basic legitimacy

Where Weber assumes the basic legitimacy of an existing system of rule, Popitz has devoted himself to the question of the circumstances under which this can arise. In Weber's conception, the legitimacy relationship between the rulers and the ruled is based on a vertical level. Popitz added a horizontal dimension to this picture. In a power relationship in which there is still no consent to legitimacy, different privileged persons could mutually recognize each other in their position, since they believe in the legitimacy of the existing relationships in their claim to legitimacy. Here, legitimacy arises initially above the heads of the ruled, which, however, has a suggestive effect on them. This mechanism can initiate a process of legitimacy formation (Popitz 2007: 199f.).

In addition, basic legitimacy can arise. This describes a legitimation process in which an order of power can receive the recognition of the inferior through the permanence of its existence. In this context it is important that order can be expected for the underdog through the emergence of regularities in their use of power (Popitz 2007: 223). This knowledge of the power-dependent about the conditions of order is called security of order (Popitz 2007: 224). The underdogs set themselves up in order and behave in conformity. Through their everyday actions, they gradually connect with the existing power structures. Due to the duration of the order, the adapted behavior can be understood as accumulating investments, the order receives an investment value. In connection with this, they develop a natural interest in the existence of the order in order to preserve the investments made (Popitz 2007: 225). The two phenomena taken together are described with the order value, the existing conditions are given a value for the inferior (Popitz 2007: 224). The longer this order lasts, the more its value and thus its acceptance increases. In this way, a relationship of legitimacy in Weber's sense can develop (Popitz 2007: 226). "We find [basic legitimacy] in various forms in all subtenants of power" (Popitz 2007: 227). Trutz von Trotha, a Popitz student, further elaborated the basic legitimacy by creating six different types. Each of these forms relates to different factual experiences of the losers in their everyday life. These experiences are shaped by the conditions of the existing order, which leads to their recognition by those dependent on the order (von Trotha 1994 b: 74).

Basic legitimacy of superior violence

Referring to Popitz's concept of violence, which describes a power relationship between the injured and those open to injury, von Trotha developed his first basic form of legitimacy. The natural or physical power difference affects the social world and structures it into superior and inferior (von Trotha 1994 b : 76). "Violence is the ultimate order-creating experience" (Popitz 2007: 61), because the "Superiority is absolute because it can put the absolute in this world, death, into action" (von Trotha 1994 b: 76). This experience contributes to the order security of the underdogs (von Trotha 1994 a: 40).

Basic legitimacy of organizational power

This further form refers to the superior organizational ability of rulers, who are able to steer the actions of the people in their sphere of rule towards the implementation of a certain goal (von Trotha 1994 b: 77). This ability to organize is particularly evident in the results of the use of data-setting power, which systematically changes the environment. From now on they serve as symbols and proof of the organizational ability of the rulers (von Trotha 1994 b: 78). The losers experience personal involvement and direct contact with the products of the organization, which prompts them to recognize the order and their superior masters (von Trotha 1994 b: 78).

Ordinary value of order

Here von Trotha essentially refers to the above-mentioned order security. By regulating the social and creating personal security, order is given a value for the underdog that contributes to their acceptance. Their value increases with the duration of their existence (von Trotha 1994 b: 79f.).

Basic legitimacy of participation

This type of basic legitimacy expresses that everyone in the domain who behaves in conformity with the order contributes to its actual validity and thus legitimacy (von Trotha 1994 b: 81). On the one hand, von Trotha refers in this context to the investment value mentioned above. On the other hand, he names the everyday value. This arises when the power-dependent get used to the order and subconsciously attach a value to their everyday life, which is shaped by the order. The two values ​​develop only with the duration of the order, but increase steadily (von Trotha 1994 b: 82f.).

Demonstration value

The demonstration value is directly related to the basic legitimacy of participation. The establishment of the first people in a new order has a suggestive and convincing effect on the observer (von Trotha 1994 b: 84). Those who were only integrated to a small extent in the previous order tend slightly to cooperate with the new conditions (von Trotha 1994 b: 85). Their actions demonstrate the end of a past order and the beginning of a new one (von Trotha 1994 b: 85). The support of the new rule structures by the elites of the previous order can also be helpful (von Trotha 1994: 85f.). To increase the demonstration value, the duration is again decisive here.

Basic legitimacy of cultural affiliation

Communities and societies establish themselves through the determination and separation of members and outsiders. In the minds of those involved there is an idea of ​​who belongs to the social group and who does not (von Trotha 1994 b: 86). It should be noted that social boundaries are relative and variable. If the ruling side is accepted by the inferior as belonging to their own social group, a feeling of equality arises between the members of the ruling relationship and, connected with this, solidarity is created (von Trotha 1994 b: 87). Orders that do not have the basic legitimacy of cultural affiliation, it seems to be impossible to ever achieve an agreement of legitimacy in Weber's sense (von Trotha 1994 b: 88).

2.4 Conflict and collapse of power

In his sociology of power, Weber was particularly concerned with the ideal description of the state of a power relationship. He spoke only sparingly on the problem of the collapse of power and the conflict over power (cf. Breuer 1998: 25). However, from some of Weber's and Popitz's remarks and the application of their theories, conclusions can be drawn about the conditions under which conflict and collapse of power take place. This is to be outlined at this point.

According to Weber, rule is an institutionalized social relationship between those who command and those who obey (cf. Tyrell 1980: 69). In order to guarantee this in the long term, he basically assumes that the rulers' belief in legitimacy in the legality of the order must exist as the basis for a relationship of rule. Different motivations of the underdogs to orient their actions to the rules of the order, such as purposeful interest and physical coercion, would make the rule only unstable (Weber 2010: 157; cf. Tyrell 1980: 61; Anter 1995: 66). A legitimate order is obeyed because it appears unreflected, without alternative (Tyrell 1980: 86f.). This is the basis of their stability.

If the ruled actually obey the orders of the rulers and act in their favor, the system of rule is reproduced (cf. Tyrell 1980: 85). At this point, we would like to remind you of the concept of chance in Weber's definition of power (see Sect. 2.2.1). This expresses that there is only one probability that the action sequence command-obedience will take place in this way (cf. Käsler 1978: 135). This implies that the existence of the rule is endangered as soon as the inferior no longer orientate themselves to the order. In the event of a rule violation of the instructions, the reproductive process is interrupted and rule passes (Weber 2010: 23). In this sense Weber emphasizes that there are fluid transitions between valid and non-valid of the order (Weber 2010: 23).

This raises the question of the conditions under which the process of disintegration is initiated. Popitz notes that social orders are man-made and can be changed through the use of power (2007: 20-22). With regard to Weber's operation with ideal types, it must be assumed that a belief in legitimacy with total claims, according to which all inferiors accept the relationship of domination unquestioned, is a borderline state that one cannot expect in reality (cf. Anter 1995: 107). Where there is rulership, one can assume that it has its critics. There is a possibility that a process of political communalization or socialization will occur in this group and that the emerging group will challenge the commanders' claim to power (cf. Ernst 2002: 76). In this case, an alternative to the existing order is formed and a fight ensues.11

Weber notes that those who aim to bring about the collapse of a rulers' association are obliged to set up their own staff if they do not manage to take the lead of what already exists (Weber 2010: 196). This indicates that the group of challengers has to experience a process of institutionalization into an association in order to compete with the existing order. The formation of an alternative ruling association, which proclaims an alternative order and challenges the existing relationship of domination, is a symbol of doubt and a sign that the belief in legitimacy has been shaken. The order value is endangered by the fight. As a rule, the legitimacy relationship is “invisible” (Anter 1995: 66). It only appears and reveals itself in phases of crisis. The competitive situation plunges them into a crisis and openly puts the assumed agreement of legitimacy at disposal, which can encourage the members of the order to reflect on their belief in legitimacy.

The “prestige of naturalness and commitment” of the order is broken. The challenging association is like a thorn in the flesh of the system of rule and threatens its existence. In order to successfully enforce the system of rule, the challenged would feel compelled to reintegrate the challenger into his own context of rule or to destroy him. However, in order to present a serious threat to the existence of the rule, the challenging association must consolidate and expand its power. As described by Popitz, this can take place as a gradual institutionalization process. In the event of a conflict within a regional association, this would mean that the challenger would also have to establish and expand territorial rule, which would ruin any previous successes in monopolization. Both would not only struggle to enforce their claim with means of power. Since the very existence of the associations is at stake, they must ensure their stability through legitimacy. For the challenger, this means in particular to first receive recognition through the various forms of basic legitimacy. However, the investment value, everyday value and demonstration value of the existing order make it difficult for the challengers to create conviction for a new order. The challenger is therefore likely to prevail where these values ​​are weak and an improvement through an alternative order appears credible to the underdog. The attempt to undermine the potential for establishing basic legitimacy would threaten the existence of the competing ruling union, which is why both sides might be inclined to use such strategies.

It would not be uncommon for the conflict to be violent. Popitz and von Trotha describe violence as a form of power that can smash rule and constitute a new one (Popitz 2007: 61; von Trotha 1994 b: 77). If the challenging association is successful in breaking down rule, it can take the place of the previous one and constitute a new order of rule. If the new rulers are able to guarantee order in the long term, it gains legitimacy. Achieving an agreement of legitimacy in the Weberian sense is possible.

Within such a conflict about social order, the terms described so far are fundamental. The adversaries strive to enforce domination. This is achieved through the use and institutionalization of power. In particular, the form of power that violence can play an elementary role. The successes of institutionalization must be secured with legitimacy or basic legitimacy in order to safeguard them.

3 State Rule - Ideal and Reality

In order to gain an understanding of the context of state rule in India, the previously explained terms power, in particular the form of violence, rule and legitimacy, are related to the concept and reality of the state. First there is a description of the ideal of the modern state, which was strongly shaped by Max Weber's conceptualization. However, it turns out that state rule in the Third World deviates from this ideal in many areas (cf. Clapham 2004: 45). The term “Third World” is not intended to imply a general homogeneity, but the states do share some things in common. These are based on a similar history, namely the experience of colonialism. The Indian state can also be assigned to this type. Deviations and their occurrence are dealt with in the following section. Finally, the two sections are brought together, following the approach of providing explanations for the conditions of state rule in the Third World.

3.1 The ideal of the modern state

Weber's interest is not in the purpose of the state. Instead, he designs it based on its functionality (Weber 2010: 1043). In Weber's ideal-typical conception, the state is represented as a relationship of domination between those in command and those who obey, which presupposes the existence of a legitimate order and organization of domination by means of control over physical means of coercion. However, it is a special case of rule. The central characteristics of the state can be summarized with the monopoly of force, supremacy, bureaucratic administration and territoriality (cf. Schlichte 2004: 64; von Trotha 1999 b: 223).

The state is an institution, i.e. a special type of rulers' association. The institution is assigned to the legal-rational form of rule (see Section 2.3.1). Weber defines it as an association "Whose set orders within a specifiable area of ​​activity are (relatively) successfully imposed on every action that can be specified according to certain characteristics" (Weber 2010: 38). The salient characteristic of the establishment is therefore that its order within its sphere of activity also successfully claims validity for all those who are not members of the association and can thus control their actions. In the case of the state, the area of ​​activity always relates to a territorial relationship with fixed borders (Weber 2010: 40/1043).

In order to ensure the successful enforcement and implementation of its order within the said geographical area, the state is responsible for " the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion " (Weber 2010: 39). The monopoly of violence is the product of a long process in which the institution state has successively expropriated private owners of physical means of violence and has concentrated all violence within itself (cf. Anter 1995: 37). The private use of force is forbidden by law, the state is subject to a legal order and thus receives legitimacy (Weber 2010: 663).12

Associated with this are further successes in monopolizing administration, legislation, jurisdiction and other areas of social order (Weber 2010: 660; cf. Anter 1995: 38). The state establishes itself as the sole source and guarantor of social order and becomes an institution for legal protection (Weber 2010: 663). The concept of the nation state combines the idea that the state also represents the political representation of a homogeneous people to the outside world (Weber 2010: 315 / 674-678; cf. Migdal 2001: 17). With the elimination of all competitors in the claimed territory and the consolidation of all regulatory functions in the state, the establishment of central state rule takes place (cf. Popitz 2007: 258). The state is the only legitimate authority within a limited area. Linked to this is the idea of ​​the autonomy and supremacy of the state. The state seems to be removed from the social sphere (cf. Migdal: 2001: 17). He dominates society and no other social actors or organizations exercise political rule next to him and without his consent. The state system of rule ranks above all other social instructions and therefore enjoys the highest chance of compliance (Weber 2010: 1044f.). In addition, there is an inherent tendency in the state to extend its rule to more and more areas of the social (Weber 2010: 660). The link between state and society is becoming ever tighter.

The administration, in other words the everyday form of rule, is organized by a dedicated staff. It is tied to the rulership center, obeys its commands and carries them out. The administration is organized according to formal, rational rules. These properties make administration an apparatus (Weber 2010: 1048). In the modern state, the staff is represented by the bureaucratic professional civil service. It is characterized in particular by official competence, free choice, specialist qualification, written, file-based fixing of processes, fixed salaries and separation of administrative resources from the office, which enables rule-based operation (Weber 2010: 162f.).

The task of the state apparatus concerns the maintenance and enforcement of the state order. It aims at the personal protection of subordinates from external and internal dangers. By means of bureaucratic administrative action, the state is able to exert a targeted influence on the actions of the ruled (cf. von Trotha 1999: 224; Migdal 2001: 17). The state imposes social rules in the form of formally established law. This is characterized by systematics and predictability. The ruling apparatus assesses whether there are any legal violations in order to then sanction them (Weber 2010: 660). For this purpose, coercive means are used to discipline. The rational and impersonal principle of rule is the central source of legitimacy for the state in that it comprehensive discipline " (Breuer 1991: 211) made possible for the inferior.

The exercise of power and the validity of the law always relate to a geographical area with fixed, definable boundaries. "The 'state' is a monopoly of force and 'sovereign' only in a limited space" (Tyrell 1992: 283).

However, it should be added that another quality of the state of Weber's concept constitutes one that is often forgotten (Tyrell 1992: 284). So he attaches importance to the fact that the state is one political Association acts (Weber 2010: 1042). For Weber, politics means the struggle to gain power, distribute power and maintain power. These struggles take place not only between the states, but also within them (Weber 2010: 1043). In the modern democratic state, these struggles are regulated by parliamentarism and party democracy (Weber 2010: 213). The monopoly of force, supremacy, bureaucratic administration and territoriality are expressions of a system of rule that has a considerable degree of assertiveness and stability.

3.2 State rule in the third world

If the mentioned criteria of the modern institutional state were applied as a yardstick to all states worldwide, it would be noticeable that around two thirds to three quarters of all states would not meet these requirements (Reinhard 1999: VII). These states can communicate with the so-called Third World13 be equated. Weber also emphasizes, however, that the modern institutional state is the development product of the specific history of the Occident (Weber 2010: 1034-1042). For this reason there are two consequences: On the one hand, it is advisable to refrain from applying Weber's state ideal uncritically as a yardstick for those countries of the Third World and classifying the deviations merely as dysfunctionalities (cf. Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 11f .; Schlichte 2008: 142). On the other hand, it is advisable to look at the specific origins of the Third World countries in order to find explanations for the differences. This is outlined below. This is followed by a summary of the differences between the state ideal and state rule in the Third World.

In the case of the historical emergence of the state outside of the West, the epoch of colonialism comes into focus as a decisive turning point. In this global process, the European state model was exported to the subjugated regions of the world, resulting in "Nationalization of the World" (Reinhard 1999). Even in regions where the ruling practice of Indirect rule14 came into effect, characteristics of the occidental state were gradually imported, for example through the stay of Western advisors at the ruling court and the continuous contact and exchange process with the powerful representatives of the European world (cf. Reinhard 1999: XI). The few non-western regions that were not colonized, such as Japan and today's Turkey, have taken the modern institutional state as a model in the course of modernization programs and imported properties indirectly (cf. Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 16).15

The different emergent products of these processes, the states of the Third World, can differ greatly with regard to the institutionalization of power relations, in particular depending on the structure of the native population and the different practices of the colonial powers (cf. Clapham 2004: 20). What is decisive is the observation that colonialism, through the interaction of the European powers with local power relations, has had a decisive influence on the design of the later independent states (cf. Reinhard 1999 b: 320).

During the establishment of colonial rule, the characteristics of the modern institutional state were linked to the local societies, principles of state rule linked to local and traditional power arrangements (Schlichte 2005: 120). This process is described with hybrid formation (see Reinhard 1999 b: 321).

As a rule, the colonial rulers never had direct control over the entire claimed area (cf. Schlichte 2005: 46). Rather, the influence was concentrated in large cities and commercial centers. This is where the institutionalization of power relations based on the Western model took place most intensively and the colonial state made use of bureaucratic administrative action to enforce power.

Apart from the colonial rulers, however, the colonial state had to make use of other means in order to emphasize its design claim. In addition to bureaucratic administrative action, von Trotha also distinguishes between despotism and intermediaries in this context (1999 a: 226). The former means the threat of violence and the use of force to implement rule. The latter refers to the attempt to integrate local collaborators into the colonial context. In order to indirectly enforce rule, the colonial administration forced cooperation with local elites in order to use their authority as a transmission belt (cf. von Trotha 1999 a: 226). Due to their influence, these intermediaries were able to mediate between the colonial administration and local society.

Even if the post-colonial states usually try very hard not to appear, the lines of continuity between colony and post-colony are very large with regard to their rulership practice (cf. von Trotha 1999: 233 a). The central legacies of the colonial powers, which still significantly shape the state in the Third World today, are the territorial borders and the political institutions (cf. Leftwich: 2005: 145). It is true that the anti-colonialist movements and the wars of independence indicated a change. Thanks to the "Charismas of the Revolution" first equip their rule with increased legitimacy. But this, too, was exposed to the process of becoming “commonplace” (Schlichte 2006: 556) and so the post-colonial state often had to fall back on the administrative apparatuses and rule practices of the unloved occupiers (cf. Clapham 2004: 68). The mix of bureaucratic, intermediary and despotic administrative means is also part of everyday rule in the states of the Third World (von Trotha 1999 a: 233). These states were often unable to extend their claim to rule over the entire state territory. The modern institutional state remains rooted in enclaves. Accordingly is "State rule in the Third World ... has remained unfinished to this day [...]" (Schlichte 2005: 111).

In the following, the reality of state rule in the Third World will be outlined using the four ideals of the modern state, monopoly of force, supremacy, territoriality and bureaucratic administration.

Monopoly of violence

The institutionalization of colonial rule was based in particular on the disposal of violent power to act. It was always used where intermediate and bureaucratic administrative action failed (von Trotha 1999 a: 226). The superiority of the colonial rulers, which was largely based on despotic procedures, was based on the external power base in the European mother countries (cf. Schlichte 2005: 120). The colonial rule largely derived its claim to validity from the basic form of legitimacy of superior violence (von Trotha 1999: 234).

The state of the Third World has often not been able to consolidate its monopoly on the use of force, especially with regard to the enforcement of the entire state territory (cf. Leftwich 2005: 150). The existence of organized, violent actors alongside the state, who compete with it for sovereignty rights, is not uncommon (cf. Pereira 2003: 388). This is about organized crime, rebels or traditional armed communities (see Schlichte 2000: 166; 2005: 140). The attempts to dispossess these groups are always expressed in conflicts, just as they are in the history of the Occident (cf. Schlichte 2009: 192). Most of the time, this process remains imperfect. The existence of actors with violence competence alongside the state, who also lay claim to rule over certain regions, means that the state of the Third World often exercises little or no control over some regions of its state territory (cf. Schlichte 2000: 157-170).

Like their colonial predecessors, the apparatuses of violence are often repressive and arbitrary. Through this procedure, with violence as the power of action, which is temporarily in a position to be superior to all other forms of power, it is possible to underpin the state's claim to power for a short time. The validity of the rule of the post-colonial state is often based to a particular degree on the basic legitimacy of the superior force (von Trotha 1999: 235). However, this makes state rule extremely fragile, since the constant violent administrative action generates resentment and reveals the weakness of state recognition (Migdal / Schlichte 2004: 34). The often unsuccessful nationwide enforcement of the monopoly of legitimate violence in the state of the Third World narrows its room for maneuver.


The limited power of the state is also shown in the fact that its order in the claimed territory and the areas of life of its residents is generally not unconditionally valid (cf. Leftwich 2005: 151).

In addition to the state, there are often powerful actors or organizations that draw their legitimacy from traditional sources (cf. Leftwich 2005: 147). Practices such as corruption, clientelism and patronage are not only an expression of non-compliance with state norms, but also a sign of orientation towards competing orders (Migdal 2001: 54).

In this context, Trutz von Trotha coined the term para-statehood (1999 a: 239-250). In addition to the state, there are a number of powerful actors and organizations that compete with the state for state tasks and also relieve it of them (cf. also Leftwich 2005: 150). By assuming ideal-typical functions of the state, they undermine its legitimacy and its acceptance is dwindling. The more efficient these groups are, the more inefficient the state becomes. Belief in legitimacy is shaken because its performance is called into question. In this context, the basic state legitimacy of the superior organizational power, which the colonial state had in most cases, disappears (von Trotha 1999 a: 242). States have always tried to assert their power against competing actors and to extend their rule. However, these processes are usually accompanied by resistance and not infrequently trigger social upheavals (cf. Schlichte 2005: 160).


From the previous sections it can be seen that the state in the Third World often does not have effective control over its entire national territory. In this respect it stands in the tradition of its colonial predecessor: the modern institutional state often only exists in enclaves around the centers of the former colonial domination and economic centers (cf. von Trotha / Klute 2001: 2). In addition, there are regions in which other orders often predominate with personal and traditional elements (cf. Schlichte 2005: 46). These regions outside the institutional order are also often less developed economically. These social and economic disparities are a source of contradictions and give rise to legitimacy deficits (cf. Schlichte 2005: 45). In the regions in which the state has no access by means of bureaucratic administrative means, like the colonial state, it has to rely on intermediary and despotic administrative action (von Trotha 1999 a: 251).

In addition, there is the observation that the societies of the post-colonial states are generally not homogeneous units (cf. Migdal / Schlichte: 2005: 18). As a result of the colonial drawing of borders, mostly fragmented societies have emerged that lack a sense of community. Due to a lack of legitimacy, ties to the state are loose. The idea of ​​the state as a representative of the population is weak among the ruled (cf. Clapham 2004: 42).

Bureaucratic administration

It was shown that the bureaucratic administrative action to enforce the state order repeatedly reaches its limits, which is why the state feels compelled to fall back on the two other forms of administrative action. This practice reveals the limited scope, enforcement and recognition of bureaucratic principles (von Trotha 1999 a: 229).

The practice of bureaucratic apparatus is also often undermined by contradicting actions of the state officials themselves (cf. Clapham 2004: 46; Leftwich 2005: 150). The practice of patronage and clientelism are part of the everyday phenomena of bureaucratic administrative apparatus in the Third World. They are a hallmark of the weak validity of state institutions (Migdal 2001: 44). For some state officials, personal loyalties and the principle of reciprocity are more mandatory instructions than bureaucratic regulations (cf. Leftwich 148). For these reasons, the state cannot be understood as an autonomous and coherent actor (cf. Schlichte 2005: 233).

3.3 The state as a field of power - state rule in the periphery

The two previous sections show that on the one hand there is the idea of ​​an ideal of state rule, on the other hand, however, this does not correspond in many cases with the reality of state action in the Third World. Joel S. Migdal has attempted to unite both aspects of the state in a new conception. Using a dialectical method, he uses the contradictions to generate explanations for the conditions of state rule in the Third World (cf. Migdal 1988; 2001; Migdal / Schlichte 2005). Migdal and Schlichte define the state as

"[...] field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2 ) the actual practices of its multiple parts and those they engage in their roles as state officials ” (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 15).

The state is described as a field of power, the shape of which is constituted by image and practice. Both image and practice contain the central element of state rule, the threat and use of force to enforce order (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 18; cf. also Migdal 2001: 18).

The image of the state relates to its perception by people inside and outside its borders (Migdal 2001: 16). It is largely based on Weber's state ideal of a coherent, autonomous actor who represents the people on his claimed national territory and creates and enforces the social order for them. The state is determined by territorial as well as social boundaries. The latter means the separation between public and private, or between the state as a ruling association and the rest of society that is governed by it (Migdal 2001: 17).

Practice means the day-to-day actions of state actors. It can be in harmony with the state order and thus enable its reproduction. In this case, action would strengthen the image of the state. However, it was found that there are often deviating behavior (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 2), which arises from the orientation towards alternative orders that are in tension with the state (Migdal 2001: 19). The existence of these orders not only implies that within the state claimed domination, people orient their actions on them and reproduce them, but also that behind them there are social actors who set and enforce competing orders. As a result, the ideal boundaries are blurred and the image of the state suffers as a result (Migdal 2001: 20). Blatant contradictions between image and practice can diminish the legitimacy of the ruled in the state order. If nobody orientates themselves to the state order anymore, that would mean their end (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 19; see Section 2.4).

The two elements of image and practice are closely interrelated (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 15f.). Deviating or conforming actions weaken or strengthen the image of the state in the minds of the people. Depending on the characteristics of the image in the minds of the members of society, it in turn influences their action orientation. Both units are in a dynamic relationship and define the state as a field of power.16

The concept of the power field means that social conflicts about the principles and dividing lines of the state determine the validity and scope of state rule (cf. Migdal 2001: 22). In addition to the state, there are various powerful social actors who each intend to institutionalize their power and claim the validity of their rules and regulations (Migdal 2001: 64/88). The competing claims of the state17 and non-state actors express themselves in conflict, but can also result in adaptation and alliances. The form and degree of state rule are constantly being redefined through this negotiation process (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 15).The results of these conflicts in turn influence the image and practice of the state.18

The conflicts between parts of the state and social actors are particularly evident in regions away from the state's center of power, so to speak in its periphery, in the local area (Migdal 2001: 65). Here are often by Indirect rule and intermediary administrative actions of the former colonial rulers, powerful rulers came into being, represented for example by large landowners, traditional elites and moneylenders, who were referred to as Migdal under the name strongmen subsumed (Migdal 2001: 67/70). 19 Because of their control over material resources, they tend to give stability to their rule (Migdal 2001: 67; 1988: 95).