How would you classify human slaughtered cattle

Distancing usage in relation to animals.

Table of Contents

0. Introduction: structure and aim of the thesis

1st method: critical discourse analysis
1.1. Classification of the term “discourse” - text as a social phenomenon
1.2. Disciplinary classification of the KDA
1.3. Exercising power through the transport of ideologies in discourse
1.4. Which does ______________ mean critical Discourse analysis?

2. Theoretical background for a criticism
2.1. Ideological starting point: eco-linguistics
2.1.1. Classification of terms "ecology"
2.1.2. Ecology in linguistics
2.2. Social relations: relationship between humans and animals
2.2.1. Anthropocentrism vs. Physiocentrism
2.2.2. Speciesism Endurance
2.2.3. Carnicism Categorization of "edible" and "inedible" animals Cognitive dissonance Shift of responsibility The missing link / the absent speaker

3. Anthropocentrism in language
3.1. Distancing use of language
3.1.1. Objectification / desubjectivation
3.1.2. Instrumentalization
3.1.3. Anonymization and de-individualization
3.1.4. Euphemisms
3.1.5. devaluation

4. Analysis part
4.1. To select the text corpus
4.2. Action
4.3. Hunting jargon
4.3.1. Text of the BMELV
4.3.2. Hunting report of the state of Brandenburg
4.3.3. Shift of responsibility in the hunting context
4.3.4. Objectification in hunting jargon
4.4. Texts of the animal food industry
4.4.1. Conclusion
4.5. Comparison of texts about pets and farm animals
4.5.1. Accidental puppies
4.5.2. Animal transport with farm animals
4.5.3. Conclusion comparison
4.6. Suggestions for an alternative language usage
4.7. Relevance of critical discourse analysis for translation studies

5. Outlook

6. List of sources
6.1. bibliography
6.2. Text corpus

7. Appendix

~ Acknowledgments

Special thanks go to my supervisor, Ms. Gunhilt Perrin. Your flexibility in terms of time and topic, as well as your professional and warm-hearted support have contributed significantly to the development of the work. Above all, I would like to thank my dear parents and siblings and my husband for their understanding and help. last but not least I would also like to thank everyone who helped me with the literature research, thought about it and gave me suggestions.

0. Introduction: structure and aim of the thesis

The present work deals with the role of discourse in the human / animal relationship. The way we deal with animals is to be questioned critically by analyzing the use of language in relation to animals. For this purpose, the method of Critical discourse analysis (KDA) must be applied. This method is presented in Chapter 1. The KDA was developed, among other things, to reveal how social power relations are reflected in discourses. It is assumed that power relations are reproduced and consolidated through the transport of ideological assumptions in the discourse. With regard to farm animals, such a power relationship exists on two levels: on the one hand, the animals are physically dominated by humans, on the other hand, this oppressive relationship requires the implicit consent of the consumer, which - according to the hypothesis - is generated in part by means of discursive means.

In order to be able to criticize the said power relationship in the context of a discourse analysis, one's own point of view must be consciously adopted and self-reflective. In Chapter 2, therefore, ethical considerations on the human-animal relationship are to be made, which then form the basis for a criticism of the status quo should offer. Thereby the concepts Anthropocentrism and Speciesism explained, which have in common as an ethical concept that humans have priority over other forms of life. The concepts Ecology and Physiocentrism or. Pathocentrism presented, which is based on a world view that describes the moral equivalence of all living organisms. In the critical discourse analysis carried out in this thesis, a eco-pathocentric Point of view assumed. Regarding the term Carnicism explains how the conceptual categorization of animals into "edible" and "inedible" testifies to an ambivalent, sometimes contradicting attitude of humans towards animals: some animals are only petted, others are eaten. In this context, the concept of Cognitive dissonance that describes a feeling of disturbance that can occur when an individual thinks and acts logically do not correspond.

Chapter 3 deals with the manifestations of an anthropocentric worldview in language. On the one hand there is language per se anthropocentric, as the world is always seen from the point of view of the People is described, ordered and implicitly substantiated with value judgments in its various areas. On the other hand, there are also traits of one in language moral Anthropocentrism, according to which man can use nature as he sees fit. Such linguistic means can serve to overcome certain inhibitions in the exploitation and instrumentalization of nature. In relation to the human / animal relationship, various distancing mechanisms can be identified which, among other things, create a distance to animals and the area of ​​killing on the linguistic level. It is hypothesized that there is a moral conflict with regard to this instrumentalization and the economic use of animals: the more we know about the sensitivity, individuality and social behavior of animals, the more difficult it is for us to cause them suffering. It is believed that through distancing and alienation inhibitions regarding the exploitation and oppression of animals are overcome.

In the analysis part (Chapter 4), various texts are then analyzed with regard to the previously explained distancing mechanisms. The aim of the discourse analysis should be to use discourse fragments to show that language transports and consolidates anthropocentric and speciesist attitudes, thus generating the implicit consent to the suppression of animals.

Subsequent to the analysis, suggestions for an alternative use of the language are presented, which should make it possible to question the prevailing anthropocentric and speciesist patterns. The last section explains how the analysis relates to the work of translators1 stands.

1st method: critical discourse analysis

The critical discourse analysis (KDA) is about relationships within society as power relations (inequality, domination2, Oppression, exploitation, etc.) by examining and showing how the use of language is influenced by social structures and vice versa. (Cf. Van Dijk 2001: 352f.) In our linguistic usage, assumptions are sometimes reflected, from which we proceed without questioning, but which can be shaped by certain power relationships. The KDA tries to uncover such connections between language, power and ideology. (Compare Fairclough 1989: 4f)

Most of the existing work within the KDA is about oppression and exploitation, for example in relation to sexism and racism. With the exception of a few articles such as Stibbe (2001) and Cole / Morgan (2011), the role of discourse in relation to anthropocentrism and, more specifically, the rule of humans over animals has received little attention in research to date (cf. Stibbe 2001: 146 ).3

In the KDA, language is expressly not understood as the sole cause of inequality, nor is it assumed that awareness automatically (re) establishes balance. (Cf. Fairclough 1989: 1) The critical discourse analysis method is more about using texts to learn something about social conditions and to criticize them. Inevitably, criticism can only be exercised from a certain point of view, which the representatives of the KDA are expressly aware of. They are always critical of their own point of view and do not think they are “in possession of objective truth” (Jäger 2012: 8). The KDA also exercises "truth criticism of such truths that are supposedly objective and eternally valid" (ibid.). (See also Chapter 1.4.)

1.1. Classification of the term “discourse” - text as a social phenomenon

Jäger (2004) understands “texts” in the KDA as “discourse fragments” embedded in the respective social references. Text should be understood as a discourse in terms of content in a social context. A single text is considered a discourse fragment or as a “collection of discourse fragments” of a discourse across society as a whole. When analyzing individual texts, fragments of an overall social discourse are examined. (Jäger 2004: 15)

According to Jäger, a discourse is to be understood as a text corpus that “does not passively represent social conditions, but rather actively constitutes and organizes them as a flow of social knowledge stores through time” (Jäger 2004: 15/25). Compared to social and linguistic approaches arguing on the basis of reflection theory, the discourse is given a completely different status, since it is itself understood as "social and society-moving power (force, power)" (Jäger 2004: 23). In the sense of the discourse analysis according to Foucault and Jäger, a discourse fragment not only expresses an area of ​​reality linguistically (does not represent reality passively), but contains elements that are decisive for the past, present or future shaping of reality (actively constitute it) . (Cf. Jäger 2004: 23) Jäger speaks of discourse as a form of social action and thus as a social phenomenon. Just as individuals are constituted in a social context, so are the texts they produce. (Jäger 2004: 24)

1.2. Disciplinary classification of the KDA

The KDA assumes that discourse is historically shaped, that it (co-) shapes society and culture, and that power relations (among other things) arise, are reproduced and consolidated through the use of language. (Cf. Van Dijk 2001: 352ff.) Furthermore, discourse does ideological work and contains ideological assumptions. The analysis of discourse and text structures can therefore not be restricted to the word or sentence level; instead, text fragments must be analyzed and interpreted in a social context. Since the content plays a decisive role in critical discourse analysis, it cannot be assigned to linguistics, social sciences or another discipline alone, but rather requires interdisciplinary approaches and the inclusion of wide-ranging methods from all scientific sub-areas. (ibid.)

There is broad agreement that the KDA differs significantly from a linguistic-structuralist perspective in that linguistic utterances should not be viewed as isolated individual texts, but rather as discourse fragments that are part of a general social discourse and should be interpreted in a social and psychological context. (Compare Jäger 2004: 10f .; Jäger 2012: 10f .; Fairclough 1989: 1)

Other related directions such as sociolinguistics, pragmalinguistics, psycholinguistics, communication theory or text linguistics differ, according to Jäger, essentially from the KDA in that they "examined language and texts primarily without considering the content conveyed by language, the respective given world knowledge", in other words, “analyze texts without considering the content they convey” (Jäger 2004: 18).

Although Jäger makes it clear that the KDA cannot be assigned to any linguistic discipline alone, he also emphasizes that it “also relates to linguistic phenomena or linguistics and other disciplines” (2012: 10).

According to Jäger, the KDA's instruments cannot be limited to linguistic instruments. (Jäger 2012: 23) Linguistics in particular is a discipline that usually comes into contact with all areas of social life. (Jäger 2004: 16) If you want to include the linguistically conveyed content in the text analysis, as provided for in the KDA, it is important to look beyond a certain scientific discipline and to include other approaches. Which these are always depends on the topic to be examined, depending on the discourse fragment.

1.3. Exercising power through the transport of ideologies in discourse

In the first part of the introduction to the KDA, we roughly explained what is meant by the term “discourse”. In addition, it was shown that the KDA, due to the consideration of text as a social phenomenon, cannot be assigned to a specific academic discipline alone, but rather combines different disciplinary approaches, i.e. proceeds in an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary manner. In the following, second part on the KDA method, the aim is to shed more light on the type of social structures that are examined by the KDA. In particular, it is about social power relations and their manifestation in discourse.

As already mentioned, the primary goal of a KDA is to make social power relations visible through critical questioning of language. The aim is to create awareness that language can contribute to the oppression of one group by another. (Cf. Fairclough 1989: 1) In addition, a discourse-analytical investigation should help to restore existing power relations questioning. Because their “pure description solidifies the status quo and makes it appear self-evident and hardly questionable” (Jäger 2012: 10).

As I said, the KDA requires an interdisciplinary approach and its fields of application are diverse. After all, most critical discourse analyzes have in common that they examine the extent to which discourse structures play a role in the reproduction of social relations of domination. (Van Dijk 1993: 249; Jäger 2004: 354)

In the KDA, a hegemonic power relationship is assumed discursive or ideological Power is exercised by generating implicit consent through discursive means. It is therefore a form of indirect Exercise of power. The consent to rule by the dominant group is generated or maintained through the mediation of ideological values. Dominant groups usually only exercise social power over other groups partially or only in certain situations. So this form of exercise of power is not absolute. (Compare Fairclough 1989: 4)

Fairclough assumes that the ideological exercise of power is predominant nowadays and mainly takes place through the ideological use of language: "[...] language has perhaps become the primary medium of social control and power." (1989: 3) In addition, language nowadays plays a major role in people's everyday lives more than ever (keyword linguistic turn4 ). Fairclough nevertheless emphasizes that although the ideological nature of language is a factor that should not be neglected, let alone ignored, in the analysis of social power relations, language is certainly not the only aspect to be taken into account. (ibid.)

Ideologies are generally understood to be beliefs that "function as shared self-definitions within a group that enable group members to coordinate their social activities in relation to other groups" (Van Dijk 1997: 26, translated by SM). A narrower meaning of ideology is a way of thinking or acting that is “developed by ruling groups in order to continue and legitimize their rule” (Van Dijk 1997: 25, see above). According to Van Dijk, one possibility to implement this legitimation is to present rule discursively as “God-given, natural, benign or indispensable” (Van Dijk 1997: 25, see above).

Ideologies seldom explicitly advocate oppression and exploitation. They are more efficient if they remain implicit and are not considered to be questionable. This is achieved by basing the discourse on assumptions that are thought to be based on common sense5 are represented based. (Stibbe 2001: 148) Fairclough calls such assumptions 'Common-sense' assumptionswhich are implicitly contained in linguistic conventions and of which one is generally not (or not fully) aware. (Fairclough 1989: 2) The 'Common-sense' assumptions serve, according to Fairclough, to reproduce ideological content through language. These seemingly common sense assumptions are therefore, according to Fairclough, "reasonable assumptions in the service of maintaining unequal power relations" (Fairclough 1989: 84).

For example, hierarchical and authority relationships are often perceived as natural without questioning, as is the case with a doctor / patient relationship, for example. According to Fairclough, such implicit assumptions can be found in language and are ideologically shaped by social power relations. Accordingly, they served as a means of legitimizing existing social structures and power relations. Ideologies, according to Fairclough, are closely linked to language, since language use is the most common form of social behavior in which we also rely most on 'common sense' assumptions. (Fairclough, 1989: 2)

The KDA's method of uncovering “common sense assumptions” can, according to Fairclough, lead to a rethink under certain circumstances. Because, he writes: If one becomes aware that a particular aspect of common sense is sustaining power inequalities at one’s own expense, it ceases to be common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities (1989: 85)

If we relate these considerations to our topic, one finds that in the case of farm animals a absolute and direct Exercise of power takes place on the part of the people. This takes place through complete coercion and through the direct exercise of physical violence. In the case of animals, there is an absolute exercise of power because, firstly, they cannot receive linguistic discourses and thus an indirect, ideological form of exercise of power would have no effect. Second, the violent and compulsive exercise of power is only possible because animals, unlike humans, cannot rebel against domination, or not in a remarkable way. (See Stibbe 2001: 146)

The violent exercise of power over farm animals takes place specifically by a relatively small group of people who are directly involved in their use. (Stibbe 2001: 146) However, this exercise of power is completely dependent on the tacit consent of a social majority, which is signaled by the purchase of animal products or products that have been tested on animals. (Stibbe 2001: 147; see also Möller 2007)

In this respect, the suppression of farm animals is also closely related to the indirect discursive exercise of power described above, which is assumed in the KDA. In the following discourse analysis it will therefore have to be examined to what extent discursive means contribute to the production and consolidation of this implicit consent to the suppression of animals.

1.4. What does critical discourse analysis mean?

According to Jäger (2012), the description of discourses or strands of discourse as an important basis for critical discourse analysis. It is just as important to be able to “evaluate and criticize the discursive facts found in a well-founded manner” (Jäger 2012: 151). The KDA sees itself as critical of society. Therefore, according to Jäger, an important part of the analysis consists in naming the object of investigation in detail and referring to its socio-political explosiveness. As already mentioned, it is essential to deal self-critically with the point of view on which the criticism is based. (See Jäger 2012 151f.)

According to Jäger, the “critical potential” of discourse analysis cannot be based on a “specific morality or even a claim to an objective truth” (Jäger 2012: 155). In this context, Jäger points out that it is the athat universal morality does not exist, but rather a moral pluralism predominates and the moral concepts bound to different cultures are heterogeneous. (Cf. Jäger 2012: 155) If one wants to make “a criticism of morals that are discursively handed down in certain societies” (Jäger 2012: 155), the prerequisite is “first of all to 'get into' the morality in question, and thus it to get to know ”(ibid.).

According to Jäger (2004), a critical discourse analysis must be coupled with “well-founded moral and ethical considerations” (25). Therefore, in the following chapter moral and ethical considerations on the human-animal relationship and the correct handling of animals are made, which are then used as the basis for the discourse analysis carried out afterwards.

In addition, according to Jäger, a critical discourse analysis has to ask whether the morality prevailing in a society agrees with the formulated moral claims of that society. It should therefore be checked whether existing moral concepts or also codified laws are in accordance with the actual social conditions or the discourses that can actually be observed. In this regard, a KDA is always company-specific, i.e. geared towards a certain society. (Jäger 2012: 156) According to Jäger, however, this does not mean that the prevailing moral standards of a society should not also be questioned. Jäger sees the criticism of existing 'morals' as a positive contribution to social development. Criticism is important in order to give cause for debate and possibly to give impetus for "modifications of the prevailing moral concepts". In a world in which foreign cultures and thus different moral concepts are increasingly colliding, questioning traditional moral concepts is all the more important in order to curb the danger of “moral rigorism”. The intercultural analysis of discursive conditions is a prerequisite for the development of models for tolerant criticism. (See Jäger 2012: 156f.)

2. Theoretical background for a criticism

As described above, every critical discourse analysis must examine one's own point of view in a self-reflective and self-critical manner. Therefore, the starting point for a critical analysis should first be described below. In relation to the human-animal relationship, the concepts of anthropocentrism, speciesism and carnisism should be contrasted with an ecological-pathocentric perspective.

2.1. Ideological starting point: eco-linguistics

The subsequent discourse analysis deals with the relationship between humans and animals or nature. Therefore, the ideological starting point for an analysis can be assigned to the field of eco-linguistics. What is to be understood by this should become clear in the following, whereby the term “eco-” should first be explained.

2.1.1. Classification of terms "ecology"

The term "ecology" was introduced by Ernst Hackel in 1866 and originally comes from biology, where he referred to the "science of the interactions between organisms and between organisms and the environment in biology" as a "holistic dynamic approach" (Fill 1993: 1 ). About a century later, in the 1970s, the term gave the name to a movement that involved an all-too-great change and exploitation of nature6 sought to counteract by man. As a result, it was used more and more in other areas of knowledge. (ibid.) So it came about that the term “ecology” was and is used in different, not entirely uniform meanings. The superficial meanings encompass the aspect of interaction as well as the "emphasis on commonality" and a "co-evolution" as a counter-model to "growth at the expense of the other" and "pure self-realization" (Fill 1993: 1). Fill rates “the appreciation, yes, preference of the small over the large”, an “attitude that opposes the further expansion of the powerful at the expense of the weaker” (ibid.) And the progressive subjugation of the small as particularly decisive for the ecological approach seeks to contain through the greater.

2.1.2. Ecology in linguistics

The term “ecology” was first used in linguistics by Einar Haugen (1972). Haugen and a few other authors applied the term to the relationship and interactions between languages. The term has also been applied to socio- and psycholinguistic topics such as language change, language death, language contact, language planning, individual multilingualism and foreign language acquisition. (Fill 1993: 29)

Later, under the term “language ecology”, the interplay between language and the extra-linguistic was examined. Dwight Bolinger postulates that language can influence our thinking and actions and can therefore be misused as a manipulator in advertising, politics and the media. (See Bolinger 1980: 182-188)

Alwin Fill (1993) also transfers ecolinguistics to the relationship between humans and nature, especially with regard to ecological problems. As with discourse analysis, Fill's ecolinguistics also makes the discrepancy to structuralist linguistics clear, in which the language itself and “not its environment or interactions” are examined. Fill presents the ecological view of language as an antithesis to structuralist linguistics, which examines the structure of language (phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, sentences, etc.) and their effects. (1993: 4f) Ecological linguistics, on the other hand, can understand "language in its role as part of a system of relationships between people, political parties, peoples, religions, etc." and see each individual utterance in the light of these relationships (Fill 1993: 3). According to Fill, studies from this point of view deal with linguistic manipulation and the “role of language in overcoming a way of thinking that is geared towards growth and size” (Fill 1993: 3). In addition, according to Fill, eco-linguistics raise "the ambitious claim to be a science in the service of a peaceful coexistence of all beings - whether they have 'language' or not" (ibid.)

Fills endeavors to establish eco-linguistics as an independent branch of linguistics. Here, different linguistic ecological approaches are to be brought together under all common aspects of interaction and the "position for the small compared to the large" or for the "endangered compared to the secured". Fill defines "eco-linguistics" as follows:

Ecolinguistics is that branch of linguistics that takes into account the aspect of interaction, be it between individual languages, between speakers and groups of speakers, or between language and the world, and which advocates the preservation of the small in the interest of a variety of phenomena and relationships. (1993: 4)

The part of eco-linguistics that deals with the role of language in the relationship between humans, animals and plants (with "nature") is particularly relevant to the present work. The use of language can provide information about how much we appreciate individual areas of nature and reflect how people make use of nature. A belittling or disguising language can hide the exploitation and exploitation of nature. (See Fill 1993: 103)

The aim of the present work is to show how the oppression of weaker groups - in this case the animals - is continued by stronger groups through the use of language. It is criticized that humans place themselves morally above nature and use or exploit other living beings for their own purposes. The following figure is intended to illustrate an ecological view of the world, in which the human being is not morally above everything, as in the left picture, but all living beings are morally considered equally:

Figure not included in this excerpt7

2.2. Social relations: relationship between humans and animals

On the basis of the ecological worldview, the next step is to introduce the opposing concepts of anthropocentrism and physiocentrism from a natural-ethical perspective. Against this background, the concepts of speciesism and carnisism, which are specifically related to the human-animal relationship, are explained.

2.2.1. Anthropocentrism vs. Physiocentrism

The ethics of nature asks about the ethically correct way humans deal with nature. Once upon a time, ethics only considered the relationship between people and people and their correct interaction with one another. In natural ethics, ethical questions are extended to the relationship between humans and nature. (Krebs 1997: 337) There is a basic distinction between an anthropocentric (Greek anthropos = Human) and a physiocentric (Greek physis = Nature) ethics differentiated. In the anthropocentric understanding of morality, the human being is the focus and nature is only considered a resource for the satisfaction of human needs - it has no moral intrinsic value. (Fill 1993: 104) This one moral Anthropocentrism is distinguished from one epistemic or biological Anthropocentrism, which is considered to be inevitable, since man cannot avoid looking at the world through the glasses of being human. (Krebs 1997: 343)

In natural ethics, anthropocentrism becomes the Physiocentrism juxtaposed. According to this point of view, nature should not only be viewed as a resource or an instrument for humans. Instead, humans should “develop awe of their intrinsic worth” and “overcome the limited anthropocentric worldview” (Krebs 1997: 338). According to this, nature has its own moral value and man must take it into account for nature's sake (Krebs 1997: 338). Physiocentrism is divided into three levels: In the radical version, all animate and inanimate objects in nature and nature as a whole are assigned moral intrinsic value. In biocentrism (Greek bios = Life) all living beings have moral intrinsic value. In pathocentrism (Greek pathos = Suffering) Finally, a living being's ability to feel and suffer is the criterion for moral evaluation. (Krebs 1997: 342)

Against the background of this third and most moderate version of physiocentrism, two ethical models should now be presented, which can be regarded as manifestations of an anthropocentric ethics and which oppose the pathocentric view. Since the following analysis specifically deals with the relationship to farm animals, two models were selected that deal with the relationship between humans and animals. “Speciesism” describes a way of thinking that leads to the unequal treatment of other animal species, simply because they belong to a species other than that of humans. The second model, "Karnismus", is a sub-form of speciesism and describes a belief system in which the use of certain animal species for meat production remains largely unquestioned. The criticism of these two models, starting from a pathocentric point of view, demands that some animal species should be accorded moral intrinsic value due to their sensitivity and suffering.

2.2.2. Speciesism

The discourse analysis in Chapter 4 aims to uncover and criticize linguistic expressions that consolidate moral anthropocentrism. The concept of “speciesism”, which describes attitudes and actions in which the interests of members of other species are subordinated to the interests of members of one's own species, is criticized. Specifically, this means that ("non-human"8 ) Animals are treated unequally or discriminated against compared to humans. In many cultures, speciesism is firmly anchored as an attitude in society and in the way people think. Critics of speciesism demand that the principle of equality should not only apply to humans, but should also be extended to (other) animals.

The term "speciesism" (species - ism) is a parallel formation to racism (Racism) or sexism (Sexism). The term was first used in 1970 by the British psychologist Richard Ryder. Based on concepts such as racism or sexism, this term should serve to include animals in the anti-discrimination movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Ryder wrote about the origin of the term:

The 1960s revolutions against racism, sexism and classism nearly missed out the animals. This worried me. Ethics and politics at the time simply overlooked the nonhumans entirely. Everyone seemed to be just preoccupied with reducing the prejudices against humans. Hadn't they heard of Darwin? I hated racism, sexism and classism, too, but why stop there? As a hospital scientist I believed that hundreds of other species of animals suffer fear, pain and distress as much as I did. Something had to be done about it. We needed to draw the parallel between the plight of the other species and our own.One day in 1970, lying in my bath at the old Sunningwell Manor, near Oxford, it suddenly came to me: SPECIESISM! (Ryder 2010)

As a result of this finding, Ryder published a leaflet on which he pointed out that since Darwin (1871) it had been scientifically recognized that from a biological point of view there was no “magical” difference between humans and other animals. So how do we justify the moral cut we made between ourselves and the other animals? Regardless of the question of the right to life, the most important moral criterion is the ability to suffer. All animals that have a central nervous system are as sensitive as we humans and thus susceptible to suffering caused by imprisonment and imprisonment. On the one hand, one assumes a similar sensitivity if one wants to obtain knowledge that can be transferred to humans through animal experiments. On the other hand, one negates the sensitivity of animals if one argues that one can experiment with them, since they do not suffer like humans. According to Ryder, the exploitation and torture of other animal species is not a morally justified means of expanding our medical knowledge . Rather, the legal principle of not harming innocent people should also be applied to other sensitive beings. (See Ryder 2010)

The British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins also takes up the concept of “speciesism”. He points out that the special status of humans vis-à-vis other animals is accepted unquestionably in our speciesist society. While the life of every human being is worth more than that of “all gorillas in the world” solely because of their membership of the human species, the value of any non-human animal is defined solely by the replacement costs for its owner. From this follows: "But tie the label Homo sapiens even to a tiny piece of insensible, embryonic tissue, and its life suddenly leaps to infinite, incomputable value." (Dawkins 1993: 81) He further reminds that although it is often admitted that we are similar to monkeys, it is mostly forgotten that we are in fact themselves. Like the other species of orangutans, gorillas and chimpanzees living today, humans belong to the group of great apes from a biological point of view. Phylogenetic9 According to research, chimpanzees and gorillas are more closely related to humans than to Asian monkeys (orangutans and gibbons). Molecular evidence shows that our ancestor, who is common with chimpanzees, lived in Africa five to seven million years ago. That means that about half a million generations separate us from the chimpanzee. Dawkins wants to point out that not so long ago there were intermediate stages between Homo sapiens and chimpanzees - that is, between "humans" and "animals" - and that the concept of species membership is too shaky to draw conclusions from it, among other reasons to draw the moral treatment of a living being. If one wants to justify that humans are to be treated better than other animals, a better reason must be found than the biological relationship. (See Dawkins 1993)

The Australian ethicist Peter Singer points out that equality is a principle of our society. If a person or a group of people does not experience equality, one speaks of discrimination. According to Singer, discrimination against animals based on prejudice is comparable to discrimination against women or other “races”.10 Singer draws the comparison to the oppression and enslavement of people with dark skin. Here people were viewed as inferior and disadvantaged - simply because they belonged to another race. Analogously, according to Singer, animals are discriminated against solely on the basis of their belonging to a species other than human. As with human victims of discrimination, we animals should abandon our prejudices and consider their interests. (Compare Singer 1995: 12ff.)

According to Singer, the principle of equality is not about all people and animals being equal. And equality does not mean that everyone should have the same rights and should be treated equally. After all, individuals are very different and have very different needs and interests. Rather, the principle of equality is about taking these interests into account equally (equal consideration of interests). (Singer 1995: 30) For example, a man has no interest in obtaining a right to an abortion, but many women do. Likewise, a pig has no interest in being given the right to vote because it cannot vote. However, like a person, they have an increased interest in not having to endure suffering and pain. From Singer's point of view, there is no reason not to extend the principle of equality to species other than Homo sapiens. (Compare Singer 1995: 31)

For the English social reformer and founder of classical utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) it was obvious that not only skin color or gender was no justification for unequal treatment, but neither was the question of whether "someone" belongs to the human species or not. Bentham argued that a living being's ability to feel pain should give it a right to equal treatment. Bentham puts it very succinctly:

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of the tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason ? nor Can they talk ? But, Can they suffer ?11 (Bentham 1789/1996)

What people and animals have in common, regardless of all differences, is the ability to suffer and thus the interest in avoiding suffering. According to Singer, the ability to have preferences - at least to be capable of suffering - is the prerequisite for being included in the ethical calculation. A stone, for example, has no preferences because it has no capacity to suffer and therefore does not have to be taken into account in ethical considerations.12 (Compare Singer 1995: 8f.)

The "exploitation" of animals for economic, culinary or other purposes can be traced back to an attitude of mind that inevitably takes the primacy of the human species as a given - speciesism. (Singer 1995: 36) Today, a worldwide movement of animal rights activists and activists calls for the overcoming of speciesism and an expansion of the existing principles of justice to include animals that do not belong to the species Homo sapiens, but are sentient and have basic needs. (Adams 1990: 23)13 Endurance

As we have seen, the charge of speciesism as a form of discrimination presupposes that animals are able to feel pain. The discourse analysis carried out here is also based on the assumption that sentient animals should be included in ethical considerations. If we assumed - as Descartes did in his time - that animals were insensitive automatons, then all the considerations made here would be invalid. Nowadays, from a scientific point of view, there is little doubt that vertebrates are sentient animals and can suffer both physical and psychological suffering from fear, 'stress', etc. In 2000, for example, an experiment was carried out with broilers to test the birds' ability to suffer. For this purpose, 120 chickens, half of which were lame, were given normal feed and food fortified with anti-inflammatory pain relievers. The lame chickens ate up to 50 percent more of the fortified feed and were able to walk better again as a result. A second study found that the sicker the chickens, the more pain relievers they consumed. Researchers concluded from this behavior that chickens are able to feel pain and have an interest in relieving it. (Cf. Joy, p.58; Chambers et al. 2000; cf. d. A. Jasner 2010)

In the 17th century, the French philosopher René Descartes in particular contributed to the 'rumor' that animals were numb automatons. He himself nailed dogs to a board by their paws in order to dissect them alive. (See Joy 2010: 109). Although not only various studies have now refuted this assumption, animal welfare clauses have been introduced in most countries as a result and common sense recognizes the suffering of an animal with the naked eye, this prejudice persists. According to Singer, it has a function of justification. By negating or relativizing the sensitivity of animals, violence against animals is legitimized and a guilty conscience regarding the violence inflicted on animals is nipped in the bud. (Cf. Singer 1995: 41) In a similar way, during the times of slavery among African people, the argument was made that people with black skin feel less pain in order to justify their violent treatment. (Compare Joy 2010: 56)

The linguistic objectification of animals, which will be discussed in more detail below, can also be viewed as a strategy to suppress and disregard the sensitivity of animals. (See chapter 3.1.1.)

2.2.3. Carnicism

As seen in the previous section, speciesism denotes an attitude that leads to disadvantage and discrimination against animals. In the speciesist unequal treatment of animals by humans, however, there are different levels. Some animals (e.g. pets) are sometimes treated almost like an equal member within a family, while other animals (e.g. farm animals) are severely disadvantaged, e.g. by being locked up, slaughtered and eaten. Human morality towards animals in general could thus be characterized as inconsistent and ambivalent. The social psychologist Melanie Joy (2010) deals with the question of where the incongruence that exists in eating only certain animal species comes from. In this sense she coined the term "Karnismus" (carnism: carne (Meat) + ismus) or in German also "meat eating" (Petrus 2013). Karnismus denotes a invisible Belief system which, according to Joy, predominates in most cultures and which means that we have to detach ourselves from animal species about which we have learned that they are edible, psychologically and emotionally, in order to be able to consume their meat with a clear conscience. Carnicism is a sub-form of speciesism, insofar as the raising of animals for the purpose of meat is a special form of speciesist inequality. Adams describes eating meat as the "crux of speciesism" because it provides the basis for other forms of animal subjugation:

If we kill, slaughter, and consume animals, we might as well be able to experiment with them, set them traps, hunt them, exploit them, and raise them in places where they are imprisoned, such as factory farms and fur farms. (Adams 2002: 80)

Joy (2010) is particularly concerned with the question of why some species are eaten and others are not. To this end, she devised a thought experiment that will be briefly summarized here. Imagine the following situation:

You are invited to dinner with your new neighbor. The mood is exuberant. Then a delicious meat dish is served. After the meal, someone asks about the recipe, given the excellent taste. The host, flattered by the many compliments, replies that the secret of the dish lies only in the good meat - the meat of golden retriever puppies (!) ... (cf. Joy 2010: 11)

Most people would literally turn their stomachs if they found out that they had just eaten dog meat. Although it is normal for most people to eat the meat of pigs or cattle (and their calves), eating dogs and their puppies is generally frowned upon in 'Western' societies.

So how, asks Joy, is it that it is considered normal to eat the meat of farm animals while the meat of pets is rejected? Joy explains this with the distinction that is made in most cultures between "edible" and "inedible" animals. (Joy 2010: 13) Categorization of "edible" and "inedible" animals

Before we go into the categorization of "edible" and "inedible" animals, we should first explain what is meant by "linguistic categories" from a psycholinguistic point of view.

Conceptual and - if they are "written down in language" (Pörings / Schmitz 1999: 15) - linguistic categories participate in the organization of knowledge, which allows information to be stored in memory and retrieved again. One speaks of so-called mental representations. A comprehensive presentation of the complex topic of mental representations, taking into account different interpretations, cannot be provided at this point.14 For the purposes of the present work it should be sufficient to outline general assumptions about mental representations.

Mental representations form the basis for the structuring and organization of knowledge and the efficient processing of information. (Cf. Schmidthals 2005: 37) According to a general definition, mental representations are internal images that are created by the stimuli of the environment that affect people. An external stimulus or its external or internal characteristics is or are "translated into a corresponding form in the human cognitive system" (Schmidthals 2005: 37). In short: mental representations depict the external world in memory. (Compare Schmidthals 2005: 37f.)

According to Anderson (1996), in principle perceptual (imaginal) of meaning-related (conceptual) knowledge representations - to which the categories belong - differentiated. (Anderson 1996: 133ff.) Perceptual representations roughly correspond to what is sensually perceived - i.e. they "contain much of the structure of the original perceptual experience" (Schmidthals 2005: 38).

Meaning-related, i.e. conceptual representations, on the other hand, are "further removed from the type of sensory experience" (ibid.) - i.e. the sensory experience takes a back seat and is replaced, for example, by linguistic-semantic representations. In the memory it is more likely to be the conceptual Property of the perceived information stored as the sensual perceptual experience. According to Anderson, this goes hand in hand with a "significant abstraction that leads away from (sensory) experiences [...]" (Anderson 1996: 147). In doing so, the “significant of an event is filtered out” and “the inessential is abstracted” (Anderson 1996: 133). In this way, information can be processed and organized efficiently and stored economically in the memory. (Compare Schmidthals 2005: 38)

If information is abstracted into memory contents in this way and stored in the knowledge memory, one speaks of conceptual or categorical knowledge. (See Anderson 1996: 147/149). Pörings / Schmitz (1999) define a concept as “the idea of ​​how something is in reality” (15). Concepts can refer to individual thought elements (e.g. a certain person) or to a whole set of thought elements. The concept “animal” relates, for example, to a number of conceptual units such as “dog”, “beetle”, “fish” etc. Such concepts, which combine several conceptual units, are also called conceptual or linguistic Categories. (See Pörings / Schmitz 1999: 14f.)

Concepts as a form of mental representations thus form the basis for assigning what is perceived to categories. (See.Anderson 1996: 147) The assignment to categories is based on “recognizing what is conceptually common” (Schmidthals 2005: 62). It is abstracted from individual objects and common features are extracted. This assignment to individual categories is essential in order to cope with the diffuse amount of stimuli received every day. New information and impressions are interpreted by comparing new information with concepts stored in long-term memory and assigning them to the respective concept categories when identity or equivalence is recognized. (See Fairclough, 1989: 10f)

Concept formation and categorization are closely related. By assigning them to categories, mental images, to which the concepts belong, can be mentally sorted. The assignment of extra-linguistic conditions to linguistic categories is usually done automatically: "Whenever we perceive something, we immediately classify it into categories." (Pörings / Schmitz 1999: 15) New and old information is sorted and evaluated in this way. This order is indispensable for human thinking, since otherwise the impressions and information pouring down on us every day could not be processed at all. The assignment to categories is not based on something like an "objective reality", but rather "our perception, our knowledge and our attitude [...] in short our human experience" (15). The division into linguistic categories is accordingly anthropocentric per se (in a morally neutral sense), since it is carried out from a human point of view and according to human criteria. As members of a language community, we usually adopt the existing categories unquestioned in our own thinking.

Most categories consist of different levels of abstraction and a branched network of subordinate subcategories or “umbrella-sub-concept relations” (Anderson 1996: 147). So if we want to speak of the term “golden retriever” or the more general concept “dog”, one could start from a superordinate category “living beings”, which would be branched out with various subordinate categories: humans, animals, plants, etc. The category “ Animal "could be on a subordinate hierarchy or abstraction level with the category" pet "or - according to Melanie Joy (2010) -" inedible animals "15 to be connected. The concept of “farm animals”, on the other hand, is represented in a separate sub-category of the “animal” category, which Melanie Joy says in principle16 should be equated with the concept of "edible animals". (Cf. Joy 2010: 14f.) The information that certain animals are edible is probably also stored in a concept that is higher in the hierarchy, such as “food”. (Compare Anderson 1996: 149)

According to Joy, the information stored in long-term memory about animals that fall into the “farm animal” category (such as pigs, cows, chickens, etc.) differs fundamentally from that stored about animals from the “pet” category. If the term “golden retriever” is used in connection with “eating meat” or “slaughtering”, according to Joy (2010) this does not fit the concept of “pet” and therefore evokes a feeling of rejection in many people. Because the concept “pet” or “inedible animal” contains, according to Joy, the connotation of a lively and perhaps perceived as likable dog. With meat from animals in the “edible” category, on the other hand, we associate other connotations - such as its taste and smell, the type of preparation or the nutritional value - we think less of a live beef, pork, lamb or chicken from which it could come . Joy speaks of a dichotomy in this context. The two categories “edible” and “inedible”, as dualistic opposites, are loaded with values ​​that are mostly based on little and inadequate information. (Compare Joy 2010: 122)

Joy suspects that the categorization of animals into "edible" and "inedible" leads to the fact that the thought process that would establish a connection between the product "meat" and the living animal from which it comes is skipped it concerns farm animals. Accordingly, this categorization leads to prejudice and discrimination against certain animal species. How we deal with a species of animal within a culture is, according to Joy, only to a limited extent related to the animal and its individual characteristics, but rather to our perception and categorization. In every culture there is a silent agreement about which animals belong in the "edible" category and which do not. In the course of time, a certain number of animals have emerged from all animal species in each culture, which are considered to be edible. Although these choices vary from culture to culture, members of each culture generally tend to view their choices as morally lofty and sensible, and to view the food of socially undeclared species as unsavory and uncivilized. (Compare Joy: 15ff)17

Allocation to the category “edible” or “farm animal” is considered problematic from a speciesism-critical point of view, as this allocation is associated with unequal treatment and disadvantage. Joy suspects that it is easier for people to eat an animal (or its meat) if the animal is 'destined' from birth to be slaughtered and bred for this purpose alone (cf. Joy 2010: 122) The author Karen Duve formulates this phenomenon as follows:

It's the label. If it says "farm animal" rather than "best friend", it sounds like cows are there to be slaughtered or to give milk. But animals are not, per se, there for human exploitation. Just as women are not there for men or black people are there for white people. People accept that animals are tortured when they are assured that it is the animal's destiny. You take everything. (Hildebrandt 2013)

Mental representations play an important role in critical discourse analysis. According to Van Dijk, they are part of a "social perception" (social cognition) (1997: 27), because members of a society shared roughly the same or similar mental representations through active and passive participation in discourses. Through the discursive anchoring and dissemination of ideologies, the individual mental representations of every member of society and, in turn, their actions are influenced. (Cf. Stibbe 2001: 148) The assignment of animal species to certain categories and the ideologies behind them, speciesism and carnism, are, as will be shown, anchored in discourse and are reproduced and consolidated through discourse. Faiclough (1989) collectively refers to the mental representations underlying the categories as members resources (MR). In a communicative process of understanding, a linguistic utterance is interpreted by the recipient depending on the existing MR (stored in long-term memory). Fairclough postulates that the MR are socially determined and ideologically shaped, whereby the assumption that these are judgments of common sense and the automatic and unconscious of such processes of understanding lead to a concealment of this fact. Since MR are mostly applied without reflection and automatically, they are a powerful means of maintaining the power relations on which they are based. (Compare Fairclough 1989: 10f) Cognitive dissonance

Joy assumes that the categorization of animals into edibles makes it possible for a system in which a carnistic belief system prevails to function. By abstracting from the individual animal to the concept of “farm animal”, the individual animal and its needs faded into the background. Prejudices would be nurtured, which would lead to discrimination in the case of farm animals. Animals are sometimes viewed or treated as "partner subjects", sometimes as "objects of use", depending on whether they are kept as pets or as farm animals. (Köhler 2005: 147) This ambivalent relationship between humans and animals can also be seen under the aspect of cognitive dissonance be illuminated.

According to Festinger (1957), the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance describes “a psychologically uncomfortable state that a person seeks to reduce and avoid” (Festinger 1957: 2). This condition occurs "when two interconnected cognitive elements are psychologically inconsistent" (ibid.).

Usually people strive for consistency and consistency and consistency in their thoughts and actions. As a rule, according to Festinger, if you think something is good and right, you would act accordingly. (Festinger 1957: 1) However, there are many examples of inconsistent action. For example, a person might be convinced that smoking is harmful but still not give up. According to Festinger, however, this apparent inconsistency would mostly not be perceived as such psychologically by the person concerned. This is because the person usually tries to downplay the inconsistency by introducing further arguments such as (1) smoking is worth the health risk because the person enjoys it very much; (2) the health risk is not as high as expected; (3) one cannot avoid every risk in life anyway; (4) if you stopped smoking you might gain weight, which in turn could be bad for your health; etc. If it succeeds, however Not To 'discuss away' such an inconsistency argumentatively, it would be perceived as psychologically unpleasant. Festinger describes this condition as "cognitive dissonance". Humans generally strive to avoid this state of affairs or to reduce feelings of inconsistency and actively avoid situations and information that could increase feelings of cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger, people use different strategies to reduce or resolve dissonance. These involve either a change in behavior or a change in thinking. (See Festinger 1957: 1ff.)

The consumption of conventionally produced animal food and the knowledge of aspects of animal welfare that have been assessed as critical in conventional animal husbandry could lead to a state of cognitive dissonance. (Cf. Köhler 2005: 148) A change in consumer behavior or a change in the conditions assessed as critical could resolve this dissonance. Since a change in behavior is often accompanied by difficulties, according to Köhler, other ways are used Dissonance reduction elected. These paths affect the cognitive level - for example, by changing the assessment of one's own behavior, or by suppressing, forgetting or ignoring certain information. That would mean, “a person who senses a moderate dissonance between their own consumption of animal-based foods and animal welfare-related cognitions” would be “mistaken about their consumption of animal foods or the conditions in livestock farming” by looking for “justifying or dissonance-resolving information” or avoids information about conditions in livestock husbandry or “assigns responsibility to other actors”. (Köhler 2005: 149) A higher weighting of positive aspects of the consumption of animal products (taste, assumed health and social value etc.) and a lower weighting of negative aspects (animal suffering, waste of resources etc.) could contribute to dissonance resolution. In the case of processed products, too, according to Köhler, the process of displacement and forgetting should be relatively easy. (Cf. Köhler 2005: 149) Shift of responsibility

An important strategy for dealing with dissonance could be shifting responsibility. Generally there could be feelings of guilt for those against the animal18 Interest-ongoing treatment of an animal can be avoided by not blaming the responsibility on oneself but on others. According to Köhler, this can be done by shifting the guilt on to the victim by devaluing the victim. Another possibility is to shift the blame or responsibility (consciously or unconsciously) on to other animals, e.g. when hunting the dogs involved in the hunt, or to other people or to circumstances that are beyond one's own control. For example, consumers could shift the responsibility for animal husbandry that is perceived as questionable to politics, the economy or farmers, while farmers in turn could reject the guilt by pointing out that the market and consumers are putting them under price pressure. In addition, according to Köhler, feelings of guilt on the part of consumers with regard to the slaughter of animals for food could be avoided or neutralized by invoking the view that eating meat in certain quantities is essential for a healthy diet. (Cf. Köhler 2005: 156) Joy cites the three “N” s that seem to apply to eating meat as things that are beyond its own control: necessary (1), natural (2) and normal (3). (Cf. Joy 2010: 96ff.) There is still no final agreement about a nutritional necessity (1) for eating meat. After all, various organizations, such as the American Society of Nutritionists and the Association of Canadian Nutritionists, recommend a "sensibly planned vegetarian diet [as] health-promoting and appropriate to the nutritional needs, as well as a health benefit for the prevention and treatment of certain diseases [providing]" (Craig et al. 2009). Regarding the naturalness (2) of eating meat, it can be said in general that “naturalness” in itself is a difficult concept to grasp. According to Joy, the ideology of Carnicism is so ingrained in our society and in our thoughts and actions that it can be taken as given and natural perceived will. However, according to Joy, the fact that humans have been mixed foodists and thus also carnivores for around one to two million years can hardly be considered a sufficient justification for continuing this tradition.

Eventually, infanticide, murder, rape and cannibalism, etc.

practiced for at least as long. (Cf. Joy 2010: 107) Similar to norms, supposed “natural conditions” are partly constructed socially. There were times when Africans were considered "naturally" fit for slavery; Jews were considered "naturally" evil and threatening to Germany and therefore supposedly had to be exterminated; it was in the "nature" of women to be subordinate to and property of men; Farm animals exist “naturally” for human consumption. (Cf. Joy 2010: 107f.) Humans as ominvores (omnivorous) and self-reflective "animals" can, according to Joy, decide whether to eat on a plant or animal basis. In addition, the question arises as to how “natural” it is that people usually do not consume their meat raw, but heat it, season it and fillet it before it is felt to be edible. (Cf. Joy 2010: 107f.) Adams also points out that institutionalized slaughter only exists in humans: “All carnivorous animals kill and eat their prey themselves. They see and hear their victims before they eat them. There is no absent speaker here, only a dead one. "(Adams 2002: 54) (cf. chapter

Regarding the argument that eating meat is normal (3), it can be said that social norms are generally socially constructed. They are neither innate nor God-given, they are created and maintained by humans - and are subject to the change of time. However, norms change only slowly, as humans as a social being usually submit to the norms prevailing in a society. According to Joy, the simplest strategy for shaping a life within a society is to adapt to the norm: "The path of the norm is the path of least resistance." (Joy 2010: 108) The fact that eating meat is considered normal and Of course, according to Joy, it leads to most people sticking with it, even if they have moral concerns. (Joy 2010: 106) According to Jäger (2012), normalism can be seen as the predominant type of culture in western industrial societies. (53) The normality of certain practices and attitudes can be similar to that in Chapter 1.3. mentioned ideological assumptions are disseminated through language. According to Jürgen Link (2006), normalism describes the entirety of all discourses through which 'normalities' are produced and reproduced in modern societies. (See Jäger 2012: 53)

In addition, responsibility according to Köhler can be attributed to supernatural actors. In fact, in the past and still is today in many 'primitive peoples', the responsibility for killing animals was often attributed to the gods. Since in their minds it was the gods who demanded the animal sacrifices, they were ultimately responsible for the death of the animals. Thus killing was legitimized by the 'will of God' or the gods. According to Köhler, in many cultures only sacrificed meat was allowed to be consumed. In 'western' societies, for which this work is specified, religious animal sacrifices no longer play a role. It would therefore not be completely absurd to assume that nowadays, consciously or unconsciously, other strategies of shifting responsibility are used. (Cf. Köhler 2005: 156)19 The missing link / the absent speaker

At this point we want to take up the question that Joy (2010) asks: Why are we so indifferent to the suffering of the pigs from which the ham originates, while we would never eat our 'pets'? Joy answers this question by saying that there is a gap in our perceptual process, a missing link in our consciousness (the missing link) (Joy 2010: 17). According to Joy, we do not make any connection between the piece of meat on our plate and the living being that it once was. The lack of this connector leads to the fact that our emotions and thoughts about the flesh and the animals are blocked. The associations, feelings and disgust that are inevitably evoked with golden retriever meat are "switched off" in certain animal species, such as cows, pigs and chickens. According to Joy, it is less the disgust at the thought of golden retriever meat than that Absence of disgust when we ate parts of pigs, cows or other so-called farm animals. So the question is not so much why we have a problem eating dogs, but rather why we eat other animals without hesitation. We grew up saying that it was "normal" to eat certain types of animals. Few of them would be asked as children whether they would even like to eat animals and whether it felt right to do so. According to Joy, we learned our compassion to switch off our empathy for the "edible" animal species as early as children. From this awareness gap it follows that we are also unaware that we have a choice and that we are making a choice by eating the meat of those animal species. If the said gap in our perception closes, a change in consciousness takes place, as a result of which one perceives all meat as the golden retriever meat in the case study above. (Joy 2010: 17f.)

The author Carol Adams (1990) describes this "missing link" as absent speakers (absent speaker). In their view, the animals whose meat we eat are the absent speaker, whose absence would not associate the meat to be eaten with the animals that were once alive and thus enable the systematic suppression of animals. A once living being thus becomes a consumable commodity, a product. There is therefore a cut connection (disconnection) between the meat and the animal killed for it. Without animals, Adams says boldly, there would be no eating of meat and yet they would be absent from the act of eating meat because they were turned into food. (Adams 1990: 13) According to Adams, "without the reference point of the slaughtered, bleeding and dismembered animal, the meat becomes a free-floating image" (Adams 2002: 52). The missing speaker, the animal, is also shown distorted. Animals are portrayed in advertising and marketing as being free and happy on family farms. According to Adams, images are created which, although they fit our understanding of morality, do not depict reality. Livestock actually lived in captivity, but in our imagination they lived “appropriately”. (Admas 1990: 19) According to Adams, our use of language contributes significantly to the absent speaker phenomenon. Adams stresses that the animals are "removed by language that renames the dead bodies before the consumer eats them" (Adams 2002: 43). As we saw in chapter 3.1.1. will see in more detail, the linguistic renaming of the parts that we eat from killed animals is understood as a means of emotional and cognitive distancing from animals and of dealing with dissonance.

3. Anthropocentrism in language

As in chapter seen, humans assign what they perceive to conceptual and linguistic categories. In doing so, he orders the world in terms of his own needs. For example, we differentiate between the important and the insignificant, the useful from the unusable, the dangerous from the harmless, the edible from the inedible, etc. the language that emerges in relation to animals morally harmless are.20 These include words with the prefixes “harmful”, “food”, “healing”, “poison” etc. (Fill 1993: 106) .Unusability for humans can also be expressed through negations - e.g. in “weeds”. Plants and fungi can also be used as edible, edible or inedible be named. From a felled tree, humans use the language to make “firewood”, “construction wood”, furniture wood ”, etc. The term“ poison ”, for example, specifically refers to substances that cause People can be harmful or fatal on contact. Adjectives like "difficult" vs. "easy" say something about how much effort it takes more human Perspective makes you lift certain objects. The word “environment” implies the point of view of the people, because it mostly denotes the People surrounding world. (See Fill 1993: 104)

Terms with positive or negative connotations are another form of anthropocentric usage. For example, the terms “garbage”, “dirt” or “stains” (mostly) have the meanings “worthless” and “undesirable”, although from an objective point of view there is no such thing as “dirt” or “waste” in nature. Even “disorder” only exists from a human perspective and does not otherwise occur in nature. On the other hand, terms such as “order”, “clean”, “pure” and the verbs “clean” and “clean”, which serve to remove the “dirty” state perceived as a defect, have positive connotations. Activities that interfere with nature for the benefit of human benefit also sound rather positive. These include: "cultivating soils", "opening up", developing, leveling, straightening, etc. In contrast, the terms that nature "reclaims an area" sound clearly negative: "desolate", "overgrown", "Overgrow", etc. (cf. Fill 1993: 105ff.)

In part, such names are morally unproblematic, as they only serve to sort the world in terms of ideas. According to Fill, however, some of our designations of nature show “that our relationship with nature is that of an exploiter”. The names solidified this type of “one-sided use” (Fill 1993: 103). The task of ecolinguistics is to examine the role of language in the relationship between humans and nature, to question it and to make a contribution to improving this relationship. (Fill 1993: 103) In our analysis we want to concentrate on the relationship between humans and animals.

3.1. Distancing use of language

In the following, linguistic manifestations of morally questionable anthropocentrism will be discussed. In the given context, morally questionable is to be understood as a use of language that favors discrimination and unequal treatment of sentient animals - one could say: a speciesistic use of language. We suspect that a distant use of language in particular can lead to an emotional distance being built up to those animals that are exploited for economic purposes. When distancing through an anthropocentric usage of language, it is generally a matter of “keeping at a distance” certain facts from the animal and plant world (Fill 1993: 107). This distance prevents an emotional relationship from being built up with the animals that would make killing and inflicting violence or tolerating it more difficult.

As already mentioned, it is assumed that the ambivalent behavior towards pets on the one hand and farm animals on the other hand is related to the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. It is therefore assumed that the mechanisms and strategies explained below for the emotional and cognitive distancing of humans from certain animal species sometimes also represent a means of dissonance reduction or prevent the occurrence of such a cognitive disturbance from the outset.

Serpell (1996) summarizes the mechanisms described below under the collective term Distancing mechanisms together. (See Serpell 1996: 186-211)21 The mechanisms do not always relate exclusively to the linguistic level, but the focus is always on this. The presented subcategories of distancing should serve as the basis for the discourse analysis carried out in the empirical part.

3.1.1. Objectification / desubjectivation

According to Joy, animals are linguistically made objects and, in fact, sometimes treated that way. (Joy 2010: 117f.) According to Fill, linguistic objectification helps to remove the killing and consumption of killed animals from the realm of emotions. (Fill 1993: 108) The linguistic distancing through objectification would therefore particularly affect animals, which are commonly assigned to the category “edible”. According to Petrus (2013), the categorization of animals into edible presupposes that we distance ourselves emotionally and cognitively from them by giving the animals Objects be made. Petrus explains the “transformation of farm animals into food” before an approach that he calls the “desubjectivation model”. Its key message is:

Our discomfort with the consumption of animal products is less, the better we succeed in making objects out of the living beings behind these products, in fact to desubjective. (Petrus 2013)

Animals are not legally considered as things. In German, Swiss and Austrian law, they are granted a special legal status between the categories “persons” and “things”. (Cf. Steiger / Camenzind 2012: 252) According to the law, animals are not considered objects, but they can and are treated linguistically and factually in many ways. Objects can be to buy, to sell or have - also animals. According to Stibbe (2001), the fact that these verbs are applied to animals in both German and English shows that the language implies the ideological assumption that animals - like objects - can be considered property. (Stibbe 2001: 151)

Objects are numb and cannot experience suffering. The objectification of animals therefore leads, according to Adams (2002), to the fact that a person does nothing reprehensible if he inflicts violence on an animal. Adams formulates this relationship as follows:

Objectification allows an oppressor to see an object in another living being. The oppressor then does violence to this living being by treating it like an object. (Adams 2002: 50)

According to Stibbe, the discursive construction of animals as objects is an expression of an ideology in which the suffering of animals is given a low priority. (Stibbe 2001: 155) Möller (2007) describes the "objectification"22 of animals as follows:

Animals are powerless in the most basic sense. By eliminating their will, their identity, their dignity - their life - they or their bodies are marketed and they themselves are made a commodity. In this way, they are devalued, ridiculed and objectified as subjects. (Möller 2007: 8)

The objectification of animals takes place on different levels. On the one hand, according to the above considerations, animals become part how Objects treated, on the other hand, they become de facto to Objects madeby processing their remains into meat and meat products.

In meat production, says Adams, on a factual level a living being is transformed from a subject to one or more objects when it is slaughtered. According to Adams, the physical dismemberment is followed by the repetition of this dismemberment on the linguistic level. (Adams 2002: 109) According to Adams, "the physical process of slaughtering an animal is repeated on a linguistic level with words of objectification and dismemberment." (Adams 2002: 51) The parts of the slaughtered animals would be 'renamed' in such a way that the formerly living animals disappeared behind the product names and nothing more reminds of the circumstances of their creation or the formerly living animal. When preparing meat dishes, cows would become “roast beef”, “steaks” or “hamburgers”; from pigs "schnitzel", "ham" or "bacon", from young chickens Chicken nuggets, etc. - the animals themselves are no longer mentioned. (Adams 2002: 51; cf. da Fill 1997: 108f .; Köhler 2005: 152) The moral anthropocentrism is clearly evident at this point, because “the objectified being only exists through what it represents for humans” (Adams 2002: 50).

In addition, hunted or slaughtered animals are often mentioned in the singular if either several individual animals or only parts of an animal are meant. We eat “veal” or “pork” and not “a piece of a pig”. (Stibbe 2001: 151) One says “whole chicken”, although it lacks feathers, feet and head. If you order “three roast chicken”, you usually don't order three chickens, but three prepared servings of leftover chicken. According to Adams, such names eliminate the animals behind them and only exist linguistically alienated as food. (Admas 2002: 77)

The living animal is thus degraded to a consumer product and thus finally to an object. Köhler also writes: “In the concept of meat, the animal has ceased to be a subject and an end in itself [...]. In the concept of meat, the animal becomes the object of the satisfaction of human needs. ”(Köhler 2005: 153) The“ renaming of the dismembered animal bodies ”leads to the phenomenon of the absent speaker, which is discussed in section was discussed.

The reduction of the carcasses to neatly presented pieces of meat leads, according to Köhler, to the fact that the piece of meat is "partially discarded of its animal origin" (Köhler 2005: 152). Köhler points out that the connection between the animal and the meat has not always been obscured as much as it is common today. In the Middle Ages it was still common practice for whole, undivided animals to be put on the dining table, which were only cut up while eating. Nowadays the sight of dead animals and their dismantling would be perceived as "embarrassing" and therefore mostly "pushed behind the scenes" and thus made invisible. (Cf. Köhler 2005: 152)

This "linguistic dismemberment" according to Adams (2002) or the concept of meat per se according to Köhler (2005) as well as the resulting phenomenon of the absent speaker would be a further aspect of the cognitive and emotional distancing from animals. This process may contribute to the phenomenon of dissonance reduction described above, insofar as a potential psychological conflict between the consumption of animal products and possible animal welfare concerns can be avoided in this way. This is how Köhler put it:

The term “meat” also becomes a possible means of dissonance reduction, since what is understood as meat - in the narrower definition of “edible animal” - is culturally defined to a large extent. (Koehler, 153)

According to Adams, behind the objectification of animals through the use of language is an ideology that implies that the mass and industrialized use of animals for food production is an indispensable part of everyday life and that the violence used against animals can and should be concealed. (Adams 1990: 26f.)

Another facet of the desubjectivation and thus the distancing from farm animals is their portrayal as indifferent and lacking in their will to the behavior inflicted on them. Möller (2007) writes that cows are often (especially in advertising) presented as if they were there with pleasure off some of their milk, since they'd had enough of it anyway. However, the lack of will and interest or the voluntariness are only feigned. Because precisely because of the existence of a will of their own, which opposes certain treatment methods, animals would have to be chained, partially immobilized, beaten with whips and sticks or forced to act or refrain with electric batons and other physical means of restraint. (Möller 2007: 8)

According to Möller, animals are sometimes portrayed as "mindless machines" in the advertising of the livestock industry:

The stylization of their bodies as milk and egg “suppliers” or meat “producers”, the pretense of voluntariness, willingness to make sacrifices, indifference to their captivity and their murder as well as the staging of dullness, self-forgetfulness and simplicity as rigid characteristics of the animals reproduces them old ideological conception of animals as mindless automatons (as with Descartes) and denies their individual personalities and their individual physical and psychological suffering. (Möller 2007: 16)

It can be assumed that the perception of animals as "willless automatons"23 leads to a disadvantageous treatment of animals and is therefore to be assessed as a speciesist practice. After all, a person does not develop an emotional relationship with an automaton, since he hardly tends to identify with such an object. As a result, one would likely have fewer moral concerns about the lack of welfare or the treatment of it Object.

Overall, the various forms of linguistic objectification of animals can be classified as a form of emotional distancing. Because through the perception of animals as desubjectivated Objects are no longer able to identify with the animals and develop empathy. From a speciesism-critical point of view, the objectification of animals would have to be viewed as morally questionable, since there is a presumption that this leads to a disadvantageous treatment of animals.

3.1.2. Instrumentalization

Another aspect of anthropocentric language practice, which is closely linked to the phenomenon of the "objectification" of animals, is the categorization of animals according to usefulness, as mentioned above. A large part of the names of animals, plants and other objects from nature contain, directly or indirectly, an assessment of their usefulness for humans. Many of these terms are based on economic principles, i.e. the greatest possible benefit for people. (Fill: 104). According to Steiger / Camezind (2012), one can speak of “excessive instrumentalization” if the intrinsic value of the animal is not sufficiently taken into account and it is viewed completely or primarily in terms of its use. The value of the animal coincides with the value of its usability. (254)

The instrumentalization of animals is valued as a means of objectification and emotional distancing of humans from animals. From a pathocentric point of view is the evaluation of living beings alone ethically unjustifiable in terms of their usefulness for humans. According to the pathocentric view, animals should be given an intrinsic moral value as sentient beings. In addition to the rough division into "edible" and "inedible" animals, there is a broadly networked category system that is oriented towards the respective human interest in use. To name just a few examples:

"Farm animals", "pets", "carriage horses", "draft animals", "mounts", hunting dogs "," detection dogs "," guide dogs "," circus animals "," experimental animals "," dairy cows "," broilers "," huntable wild animals “Etc. (Fill 1993: 106) In some cases, animals of the same animal species are assigned to a different category than their conspecifics depending on the context of use and accordingly experience different treatments. For example, depending on the context, rabbits can live as “pets”, “fattening rabbits” (food), “pests”, “circus animals” or as “experimental animals”. (Cole / Morgan 2011: 112) According to Cole / Morgan, the assigned category usually determines whether an animal is allowed subjectivity or whether they are viewed and treated as passive objects - or implicitly on "animal machines" (animal machines) would be reduced. (Cf. Cole / Morgan 2011: 112) According to Möller, the determination of animals is not given by nature, but rather socially constructed and the product of an ideology of man. The division into use categories shows that humans primarily view animals as a commodity resource. (Möller 2007: 8) From a speciesism-critical point of view, the mentioned assignment of animals to usefulness categories is morally questionable, as it leads to unequal treatment of animals.

3.1.3. Anonymization and de-individualization

Other mechanisms for creating emotional and cognitive distance to animals are anonymization and de-individualization, both of which are closely related to the phenomenon of desubjectivation. Köhler writes:

Humans tend to avoid potential moral conflicts related to animal use by not engaging with the animal as an independent subject. The animal remains an anonymous object. (Koehler 2005: 150)

According to Köhler, the animals are internally kept at a distance through anonymization. The anonymization takes place on the one hand through the spatial separation and the lack of direct contact with animals that live in the intensified livestock husbandry24